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This Dissertation comprises two essays that investigate how consumer’s
motivations affect their consumption behavior, such as purchase intentions and 
product valuation.
Motivation is a predisposition to behave in a certain way. Motives are a motor 
for action, stimulating behavior that helps individuals achieve their goals (Fiske 
2008). Contemporary motivation theory (e.g., Fitzsimons and Bargh 2004;
Kruglanski et al. 2002) assumes two important characteristics of motives and goals 
that are fundamental for this proposal. First, motives and goals are mentally 
represented in the same way as are other cognitive constructs. Motives and goals 
correspond to internal knowledge structures containing information such as possible 
means and behavioral procedures for attaining a goal. Second, this motivation-as-
cognition approach implies that motivation is dynamic and that it can be primed and 
automatically activated by diverse environmental features, that is, by the mere 
presence of situational cues associated with those goals.
Motivation, rather than being stable and individual, is a dynamic process 
because it can be activated from various different sources, because it can be activated 
without intervening conscious choice, and because the same stimulus can activate 
different motivations depending on the person or the situation. Operating motivations, 
consciously or non-consciously, influence consumers’ thoughts, feelings, and 
behavior. This dissertation proposal investigates the interplay of several motives and 
goals, which are activated in different ways, and how they affect consumer behavior. 
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Essay 1 investigates consumers’ motivation to correct their judgments for the 
influence of a recommendation. Consumers may initially comply with or resist
product recommendations, depending on the perceived credibility of the 
recommender. At times, however, consumers may be motivated to avoid this external 
influence and simply rely on their own opinion (Wegener et al. 2004). We propose 
that asking consumers to correct their judgments will affect their judgment certainty 
and behavioral intentions toward the recommended product differently. Specifically, 
when consumers initially receive a high credibility recommendation favoring a 
product (e.g., from a consumer protection agency), correction will decrease their 
judgment certainty and behavioral intentions. Conversely, when consumers initially 
receive a low credibility recommendation (e.g., from the manufacturer of the 
product), correction will increase their judgment certainty and behavioral intentions. 
Ironically, then, consumers’ compliance with a low credibility recommendation may
increase after correction. Results from study 1 support these predictions and show 
that the interactive effect of recommendation credibility and correction on behavioral 
intentions is mediated by judgment certainty. Study 2 examines the case of a 
recommendation opposing a product, a situation in which the relationship between 
judgment certainty and behavioral intentions should be negative rather than positive. 
Finally, study 3 examines the role of certainty more closely, showing that 
recommendations associated with greater certainty produce more positive behavioral 
intentions, but correction decreases behavioral intentions when initial certainty is high
and increases behavioral intentions when initial certainty is low.
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Essay 2 examines the influence of consumers’ motivations on their product 
valuation. It is well known that often sellers overvalue products relative to buyers
(Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990; Thaler 1980). We propose that buyers and 
sellers value products in a way that satisfies their intrinsic motivations. When 
consumers adopt the social role of buyers and sellers, they behave accordingly to best 
achieve these goals.  We test the extent to which buyers’ motivation to minimize what
they are giving up and sellers’ motivation to maximize what they are getting affects
their product valuation and can account for the price disparity effect. In a series of 
five studies, we apply principles of goal theory (Kruglanski et al. 2002; Shah and 
Kruglanski 2008) to support the motivated valuation explanation and show that 
altering the goal pursuit of negotiators moderates the price disparity effect. Study 1 
explores the psychological factors underlying the price disparity and shows that 
buyers and sellers approach a transaction with a mindset of “giving up money” or 
“getting money,” respectively. In studies 2 and 3 we provide support for the 
motivated valuation explanation by measuring buyers’ and sellers’ goal activation via 
reaction time to goal-related words (study 2) and by priming the proposed goals of 
buyers and sellers to neutral traders and conceptually replicating the price disparity 
effect (study 3). Studies 4 and 5 investigate conditions under which goal pursuit of 
buyers and sellers might change and, therefore, their valuation change as well. In 
study 4 we prime alternative goals, and in study 5 we manipulate goal fluency, each
of which should facilitate or inhibit goal pursuit/ achievement, thereby moderating the 
price disparity effect.
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Figure 1 summarizes the main constructs we examine in the two essays that 
follow.
Figure 1 - Dissertation Conceptual Framework
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Chapter 1: Essay 1 – The Bidirectional Effect of Correction on Judgment Certainty 
and Behavioral Intentions
Introduction
Consumers are often bombarded with persuasive messages recommending 
products. At times, consumers may be motivated to rely on their own opinions and 
avoid the influence of such messages on their judgments. Correction processes can be 
instigated in several ways such as via explicit instructions to correct (Wegener and 
Petty 1995), disclaimers that may call consumers’ attention to specific information 
(Johar and Simmons 2000), or messages incorporated in advertising. For example, 
General Motors recently ran an ad in which they described the benefits of their new 
Pontiac and then suggested "Don't take our word for it, … discover for yourself."
We examine one mechanism through which correction processes operate to 
influence consumer behavior. Specifically, we show that correction affects the 
certainty with which consumers hold their judgments about a recommended product, 
in turn influencing their behavioral intentions. Judgment certainty is defined as a 
sense of confidence about one’s judgments (Gross, Holtz, and Miller 1995), and 
judgment certainty has been found to change as a consequence of consumers 
observing their reactions to persuasive attempts (Tormala, Clarkson and Petty 2006). 
Although previous work suggests that correction tends to decrease consumers’ 
certainty about their judgments (Tormala, DeSensi, and Petty 2007), we challenge the 
notion that correction will always have a unidirectional effect on consumers’ 
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certainty. Previous work suggests that reminding consumers to correct their 
judgments highlights potentially inappropriate influences on their judgments. If their 
judgments were influenced inappropriately, judgment certainty should decrease, and 
consumers should become consistently less likely to comply with a product 
recommendation (Tormala et al. 2007). Another possibility, however, is that 
consumers may lose or gain certainty in their judgments about the recommended 
product depending on how they appraise the initial persuasion attempt. Building on 
the correction and persuasion literature (Wegener and Petty 1995; Wegener et al. 
2004), we propose that correction will have a bidirectional effect on judgment 
certainty and behavioral intentions, such that certainty will decrease when the 
persuasion attempt is perceived to have high credibility but will increase when the 
persuasion attempt is perceived to have low credibility. 
Understanding the impact of correction on judgment certainty is important 
because judgment certainty influences consumer behavior (Tormala and Petty 2004b). 
For example, attitude certainty increases the predictive power of consumer attitudes 
such that when consumers are more certain of their attitudes, they are more likely to 
act on their attitudes (Tormala and Petty 2002). We go one step further and show that 
the certainty with which consumers hold their judgments can directly influence 
consumers’ compliance with a product recommendation and, therefore, their 
behavioral intentions. The possibility that certainty may affect behavioral intentions 
directly has been theoretically considered and empirical tests have been encouraged 
(Tormala and Petty 2004b). 
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In a series of three studies, we demonstrate the bidirectional effect of correction 
on judgment certainty and behavioral intentions. In our first study, we show that a 
low credibility recommendation, such as a manufacturer recommending its own 
product, produces low judgment certainty. Ironically, asking consumers to correct for 
the influence of this low credibility recommendation makes them more certain about 
their product judgments and more likely to comply with the recommendation and 
purchase the product. In our second study, we provide additional support for our 
hypotheses by examining the effect of recommendation credibility and correction on 
compliance with a negative rather than a positive recommendation, when the 
relationship between judgment certainty and behavioral intentions should be negative 
rather than positive. In the third study, we examine the role of certainty more closely
by manipulating certainty subliminally and showing that correction increases 
compliance with a recommendation when certainty is initially low but decreases 
compliance with a recommendation when certainty is initially high. 
By showing that correction has a bidirectional effect on judgment certainty and 
that certainty directly influences behavioral intentions, our research contributes to the 
literature in at least three ways. First, we show that correction can either decrease or 
increase judgment certainty, rather than consistently decreasing it. Second, we show 
that in the context of recommendations, judgment certainty can influence behavioral 
intentions directly, beyond strengthening the relationship between attitudes and 
behavioral intentions. Third, we demonstrate that in addition to lay theories of 
influence (Wegener and Petty 1995), certainty is an important part of the correction 
process. Figure 2 illustrates our theoretical framework.
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Figure 2 - Chapter 1 Theoretical Framework
Theoretical Background
A variety of source characteristics have been found to influence consumers’ 
responses to persuasion attempts (Wilson and Sherrell 1993). Source credibility, the 
degree to which a source is believed to be expert and trustworthy in communicating 
accurate and truthful information (Hovland, Janis and Kelley 1953), is of particular 
importance in marketing due to its managerial relevance (Petty and Wegener 1998; 
Briñol, Petty and Tormala 2004). Source credibility often serves as a simple 
acceptance/rejection heuristic (Chaiken and Maheswaran 1994). Indeed, previous 
research has shown that individuals are likely to unthinkingly accept information 
presented by high credibility endorsers as valid and, consequently, be more willing to 
comply with the message (Priester and Petty 2003). On the other hand, when 
consumers perceive a recommender to be low in credibility, they may downplay the 
recommendation and be less willing to comply with it (Campbell and Kirmani 2008; 
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Hamilton 2003). Based on this previous work, we expect that consumers will be more 
willing to comply with a recommendation when the recommendation comes from a 
high credibility source than when it comes from a low credibility source. Because the 
primary goal of product recommendations is to motivate consumers to comply with 
the recommendation and purchase the product (Bodapati 2008), we focus on the 
effect of recommendations on behavioral intentions, which are the best predictor of 
actual behavior (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975).
In addition to influencing compliance with a recommendation, source credibility 
serves as relevant evidence for validating consumers’ judgments (Kruglanski and 
Thompson 1999, Kruglanski and Chun 2008). Specifically, high source credibility 
may increase the certainty with which consumers hold their judgments about the
product being recommended. Trustworthiness, one component of source credibility, 
has been found to positively influence perceived certainty (Sorrentino et al. 1995). 
Similarly, high source credibility increases the confidence consumers have in their 
thoughts about an advertised product (Briñol et al. 2004). When product 
recommendations are perceived to be credible, they usually increase the confidence 
associated with a decision (Fitzsimons and Lehmann 2004; Häubl and Trifts 2000). 
Thus, we propose that a high credibility recommendation should produce product 
judgments held with greater certainty, while a low credibility recommendation should 
produce judgments held with less certainty. 
H1a: High credibility recommendations will produce greater judgment 
certainty than low credibility recommendations.
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H1b: High credibility recommendations will produce greater compliance than 
low credibility recommendations.
Although the goal of product recommendations is to influence consumer 
behavior, under some circumstances consumers may be motivated to make their 
decisions based on their own opinions and not let external factors influence them. For 
example, consumers may be warned by family members or friends to avoid the 
influence of salespeople while shopping for a car, or they may see a sign posted by a 
consumer protection agency alerting them to scams used by pushy home 
improvement contractors. In such cases, consumers may attempt to update or 
“correct” for the influence of these sources on their judgments. 
Correction processes are based on the implicit theories people hold about their 
own cognitive processes (Jost, Krugklanski, and Nelson 1998; Wegener, Petty, and 
Dunn 1998). Because people make corrections based on how they believe a given 
factor influences their judgments, engaging in correction can potentially produce the 
opposite effect of that initially intended (Rucker and Petty 2006; Wegener et al. 
2004). For example, Petty, Wegener, and White (1998) found that while a liked 
source may produce more positive judgments than a disliked source, correcting for 
the perceived influence of a liked source can make judgments less positive, and 
correcting for the perceived influence of a disliked source can make judgments more 
positive. These bidirectional effects of correction on judgments can eliminate or even 
reverse a source likeability effect (Petty et al. 1998).
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Previous research has not explicitly examined the effect of correction on 
judgment certainty. However, it has been suggested that correction motivates 
consumers to observe their reactions to a persuasive attempt (Briñol et al. 2004), and 
judgment certainty has been found to change as a consequence of consumers 
observing their reactions to persuasive attempts (Tormala, Clarkson, and Petty 2006). 
For example, Tormala, DeSensi and Petty (2007) investigate a situation in which 
individuals perceive an external influence on their judgments and, rather than 
changing their attitudes, they lose certainty. The authors suggest that under these 
conditions, correction decreases judgment certainty. 
Building upon the judgment correction literature (Wegener and Petty 1995) we 
predict that correction may not always decrease judgment certainty, but will affect 
judgment certainty differently depending on how consumers appraise the situation.
Previous research on correction processes suggests that if consumers realize they 
have been influenced by a persuasive attempt and they are motivated to correct their 
judgments, they will correct their judgments in the direction opposite to which they 
believe they were influenced (Wegener and Petty 1995; Wegener et al. 2004). We 
propose that the bidirectional adjustments prompted by correction will hold not only 
for compliance (behavioral intentions), but also for judgment certainty. Specifically, 
high credibility sources are perceived as having the consumer’s best interests at heart, 
so when a consumer corrects after processing a message from a high credibility 
source, some ambivalence may result and judgment certainty may decrease (Tormala 
and Petty 2004b). Thus, we predict that when consumers receive a high credibility 
recommendation, correction will motivate consumers to reappraise their initial 
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compliance with the recommendation, and the certainty with which they hold their 
product judgments will decrease (Tormala, Clarkson, and Petty 2006). On the other 
hand, if consumers receive a low credibility recommendation, correction instructions 
should motivate consumers to reappraise the persuasion attempt and realize their 
initial resistance to the recommendation (Tormala and Petty 2002; Tormala and Petty 
2004b). As a consequence, judgment certainty will increase. 
In summary, consistent with the correction literature (Petty and Wegener 1995; 
Petty, Wegener, and White 1998), we expect that the effect of recommendation 
credibility on both certainty and compliance with a recommendation will be 
moderated by correction.
H2: Correction instructions will decrease judgment certainty when a 
recommendation is high in credibility, but will increase judgment 
certainty when a recommendation is low in credibility.
H3: Correction instructions will decrease compliance with a recommendation 
when a recommendation is high in credibility, but will increase 
compliance when a recommendation is low in credibility.
The literature on certainty and persuasion suggests that even when consumers do 
not change their overall attitudes in response to a persuasive message, accompanying 
changes in certainty may have important implications for behavior (Rucker and Petty 
2006; Tormala and Petty 2002, 2004a, 2004b). Attitude certainty, for instance, has 
been found to strengthen attitudes. Specifically, the higher the certainty of one’s 
attitude, the better that attitude predicts behavior (Tormala and Rucker 2007). 
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Although this literature has shown an increase in attitude-behavior correspondence 
when certainty increases, changes in behavioral intentions have not yet been directly 
linked to changes in certainty. The possibility that certainty may produce changes in 
the level of behavioral intentions has been theoretically considered (Tormala and 
Petty 2004b) but prior research has not examined conditions under which behavioral 
intentions change directly as a consequence of certainty. 
We argue that the certainty with which consumers hold their judgments will 
directly influence the extent to which consumers comply with a product 
recommendation. A recommendation from a high credibility source should make 
consumers feel certain about their judgments and create behavioral intentions that are 
consistent with the recommendation. For example, a recommendation from a 
government agency recommending that consumers use a certain product is likely to 
be perceived as a high credibility recommendation, producing high judgment 
certainty and favorable behavioral intentions toward the recommended product. In 
contrast, a recommendation from a low credibility source, such as the product’s 
manufacturer, should make consumers feel uncertain and less likely to comply with 
the recommendation. In other words, we expect that the judgment certainty produced 
by high or low credibility recommendations will directly influence compliance with 
the recommendation.
H4: Judgment certainty will mediate the interactive effect of recommendation 
credibility and correction on compliance with the recommendation
(mediated moderation). 
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Study 1: The Bidirectional Effect of Correction
In study 1, we manipulate recommendation credibility and correction, and we 
expect that these manipulations will interact to influence judgment certainty and 
behavioral intentions. We manipulate recommendation credibility by varying the 
trustworthiness of the recommender and we include a control condition to investigate 
the locus of movement prompted by the correction process.
Method
Study 1 employed a 3 recommendation credibility (high credibility vs. control 
vs. low credibility) x 2 correction (no correction vs. correction) design. Participants 
were 267 university students who voluntarily agreed to take part in a consumer 
behavior survey at the student union or behavioral lab in exchange for a candy bar, 
financial compensation, or course credit.
Participants were told that they would be taking part in a survey about their 
opinions of a product, phosphate detergent. This product was unfamiliar to most of 
the participants, increasing the likelihood that participants’ attitudes would be 
influenced by the information they learned during the study (Bettman, Luce and 
Payne 2008). To generate a positive attitude toward the product, all participants read 
a pamphlet with strong arguments favoring phosphate detergent (for stimuli adapted 
from Tormala, Briñol and Petty 2006, see appendix A). To ensure that participants 
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would form a judgment about the product, they were asked to write at least six 
sentences describing their thoughts about phosphate detergent.
Recommendation Credibility Manipulation. To manipulate recommendation 
credibility, we varied the trustworthiness of the recommender using a manipulation 
adapted from Tormala, Briñol and Petty (2006). Participants in the high credibility 
condition learned that the information they had just read was “taken from a pamphlet 
produced by a federal agency that investigates consumer products and strongly 
recommends consumers to use phosphate detergents.” Participants in the low 
credibility condition read that the information they had just read was “taken from a 
pamphlet produced by a major soap and detergent company that makes phosphate 
detergents and strongly recommends consumers to use them.” Participants in the 
control condition read that the information they had just read was “taken from a 
pamphlet that strongly recommends consumers to use phosphate detergents.” 
Correction Manipulation. In the no correction condition, participants answered 
the manipulation check items and dependent variables immediately after reading the 
trustworthiness manipulation. In the correction condition, participants responded to 
the certainty manipulation checks and then read the correction manipulation on the 
following page: “In the next section, you will be asked to answer several questions 
about these detergents. It is very important that your answers be based on your own 
opinion of the detergents, rather than anyone else’s opinion,” and then continued to 
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answer the remaining questions. The correction manipulation was adapted from 
Wegener and Petty (1995).
Measures. Trustworthiness of the recommender was measured with two items 
(“How much do you trust the producer of the pamphlet you have read?” and “To what 
extent do you think the producer of the pamphlet you have read is being sincere?”). 
The primary dependent measures were judgment certainty and behavioral 
intentions. Judgment certainty was captured with two items ranging from one (not at 
all certain) to seven (very certain): “How certain are you about which detergent is 
better?” and “How certain are you about your preference for one of the detergents?” 
Behavioral intentions were measured using two relative items ranging from one to 
seven. Scale end points for the first item were “I would be more willing to buy 
standard/phosphate detergent,” and scale end points for the second item were “I 
prefer standard/phosphate detergent.” 
To insure that positive attitudes toward phosphate detergent had been created 
by our stimuli, we measured attitudes using a relative scale ranging from one to 
seven, with end points “I like standard/ phosphate detergent more.” We also ran a 
confirmatory factor analysis to assess whether attitudes and behavioral intentions 
were distinct measures. The attitude and behavioral intentions items loaded on 
different factors with over 93% of the variance explained.   
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Results
Manipulation Checks. Suggesting that our manipulations indeed influenced 
perceived recommendation credibility, we found a main effect of the manipulation on 
the trustworthiness index (α = .86) in a 3 (recommendation credibility) x 2 
(correction) ANOVA (F(2, 259) = 6.70, p < .001; η2 = .05). As predicted, participants 
perceived the federal agency to be more trustworthy than the manufacturer (Mhigh 
credibility = 3.94, Mcontrol = 3.48, Mlow credibility = 3.19). No further effects were significant 
in these analyses (all p > .21). Table 1.1 reports the means by condition.
Judgment Certainty. As predicted, a 3 (recommendation credibility) x 2 
(correction) ANOVA with the judgment certainty index (α = .90) as the dependent 
variable revealed an interaction between recommendation credibility and correction 
(F(2, 259) = 5.43, p < .01; η2 = .04). Supporting H1a, planned contrasts indicate that 
the effect of recommendation credibility on judgment certainty was significant when 
no correction instruction was given (Mhigh credibility = 4.39, Mcontrol = 4.34, Mlow credibility
= 3.42; F(2, 259) = 4.04, p < .02; η2 = .03). Consistent with H2, correction eliminated 
the effect of recommendation credibility (Mhigh credibility = 3.60, Mcontrol = 4.26, Mlow 
credibility = 4.33; F(2, 259) = 2.26, p > .10). 
Providing support for the bidirectional effect of correction on judgment certainty
(H2), correction decreased certainty in the high credibility recommendation condition 
(F(1, 259) = 4.66, p < .05; η2 = .02), increased certainty in the low credibility 
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recommendation condition (F(1, 259) = 6.20, p < .05; η2 = .02), and did not affect 
certainty in the control condition (F(1, 259) = .03, p > .86; η2 = .00, see figure 3). 
Figure 3 - Certainty of Judgments about Recommended Product
Behavioral Intentions. A 3 (recommendation credibility) x 2 (correction) 
ANOVA revealed the predicted interaction between recommendation credibility and 
correction on behavioral intentions ( = .88; F(2, 259) = 4.13, p < .02; η2 = .03). 
Supporting H1b, the effect of recommendation credibility on behavioral intentions
was significant when no correction instruction was given (Mhigh credibility = 5.16, Mcontrol
= 5.02, Mlow credibility = 4.35; F(2, 259) = 4.58, p < .01; η
2 = .03). However, the effect of 
recommendation credibility was not significant when participants were asked to 
correct their judgments (Mhigh credibility = 4.59, Mcontrol = 5.17, Mlow credibility = 4.90; F(2, 
259) = 1.57, p > .21). 
Providing support for the bidirectional effect of correction on behavioral 
intentions (H3), planned contrasts indicate that correction decreased compliance with 
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the high credibility recommendation (F(1, 259) = 4.24, p < .05; η2 = .02), increased 
compliance with the low credibility recommendation (F(1, 259) = 3.89, p < .05; η2 = 
.02), and did not affect compliance with the recommendation in the control condition 
(F(1, 259) = .15, p > .70). 
Attitudes. As expected, attitudes toward phosphate detergent were positive (M = 
4.78) and significantly higher than the scale midpoint (F(1, 263) = 68.66, p < .01). A 
3 (recommendation validity) x 2 (correction) ANOVA with attitudes as the dependent 
variable revealed only a main effect of recommendation credibility (F(1, 258) = 3.94, 
p < .02; η2 = .03). Notably, the interaction between recommendation credibility and 
correction was not significant for the attitudes measure (F(1, 258) = 1.81, p > .17). 
Thus, although attitudes and behavioral intentions are highly correlated (r = .80, p < 
.001), changes in attitudes cannot explain the changes in behavioral intentions due to 
correction. 
Table 1.1 - Dependent Measures as a Function of Recommendation Credibility and 













Trustworthiness 4.11 (1.46) 3.55 (1.68) 3.01 (1.45) 3.77 (1.58) 3.41 (1.31) 3.38 (1.43)
Judgment 
certainty
4.39 (1.93) 4.34 (2.15) 3.42 (1.72) 3.60 (1.85) 4.26 (2.03) 4.33 (1.75)
Behavioral 
intentions
5.16 (1.30) 5.02 (1.65) 4.35 (1.06) 4.59 (1.61) 5.17 (1.38) 4.90 (1.51)
Attitudes 5.09 (1.40) 5.11 (1.73) 4.26 (1.26) 4.71 (1.53) 5.11 (1.45) 4.67 (1.68)
N 54 28 51 51 27 54
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Mediation Analysis. Our framework suggests that correction has a bidirectional
effect on judgment certainty and that certainty influences behavioral intentions. To 
provide support for this framework, we conducted a series of regressions to perform a 
mediated moderation analysis using the technique recommended by Muller, Judd, and 
Yzerbyt (2005). In each regression equation, we considered the effect of each 
contrast-coded independent variable as well as the appropriate interactive effect. In 
the first regression, recommendation credibility, correction, and the interaction 
between recommendation credibility and correction were included as predictors of 
behavioral intentions. Only the interaction between recommendation credibility and 
correction affected the dependent variable (β = .277, SE = .09, t = 2.83, p < .005). In 
the second regression, the same variables were included as predictors of the 
mediating variable judgment certainty. Only the interaction between recommendation 
credibility and correction affected judgment certainty (β = .423, SE = .13, t = 3.27, p
< .001). In the third regression, recommendation credibility, correction, judgment 
certainty, the interaction between recommendation credibility and correction, and the 
interaction between certainty and correction were included as predictors of behavioral 
intentions. We found that the mediator variable judgment certainty affected 
behavioral intentions (β = .255, SE = .05, t = 5.77, p < .001) and that the interaction 
between recommendation credibility and correction became only marginally 
significant (β = .169, SE = .09, t = 1.79, p = .08). Providing support for H4, a Sobel 
test confirms that mediation by judgment certainty is significant (z = 2.41, p < .01). 
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Discussion
The results of study 1 are consistent with our predictions and provide support for 
the bidirectional effect of correction on judgment certainty and for the direct impact 
of judgment certainty on behavioral intentions. Study 1 fully supports hypotheses 1-4. 
We show that without correction, a high (low) credibility recommendation produces 
greater (lower) judgment certainty, making consumers more (less) likely to comply 
with a recommendation. Supporting the predicted bidirectional effect of correction, 
correcting for the influence of a high credibility recommendation reduces judgment 
certainty, while correcting for the influence of a low credibility recommendation 
increases judgment certainty. A similar pattern of results is found for behavioral 
intentions and, as expected, judgment certainty mediates the effect of 
recommendation credibility and correction on behavioral intentions. These results 
provide evidence that correction processes can operate by changing consumers’ 
judgment certainty. 
One limitation of study 1 is that we have examined the effects of correction 
only when a recommendation leads to positive attitudes toward the product. In study 
2, we examine the same process when consumers receive a negative recommendation.
Moreover, to examine the robustness of the credibility construct and increase the 
generalizability of our findings, we manipulate credibility via the expertise of the 
recommender.
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Study 2: Reversing the Relationship between Judgment Certainty and Behavioral 
Intentions
In study 2 we provide additional support for the bidirectional effect of 
correction on judgment certainty and behavioral intentions by examining a situation 
in which the relationship between certainty and behavioral intentions should be 
negative rather than positive. In study 1, the positive recommendation of the product 
encouraged participants to form a positive attitude toward the product. Thus, greater 
compliance was indicated by more favorable behavioral intentions toward phosphate 
detergents relative to standard detergents and judgment certainty had a positive 
impact on behavioral intentions. In study 2, a negative recommendation of the 
product will encourage participants to form a negative attitude toward the product. 
Thus, greater compliance will be indicated by less favorable behavioral intentions. If 
participants receive a negative recommendation about a product, the more certain 
they will be (that the product is bad) and the less favorable their behavioral intentions 
will be. In study 2, we also test the robustness of our results by using a different 
manipulation of source credibility. Instead of manipulating the trustworthiness of the 
recommender as in study 1, we manipulate the expertise of the recommender. 
Method
Study 2 employed a 2 recommendation credibility (high credibility vs. low 
credibility) x 2 correction (no correction vs. correction) design. Participants were 246
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university students who participated in the computer-based study during a one-hour 
research session in exchange for course credit. 
Participants were told that they would be taking part in a survey concerning 
their opinions about an issue that had been receiving media attention. A report about 
phosphate detergent was adapted from study 1 to argue unambiguously against 
phosphate detergents (appendix B). After examining the report, participants were 
asked to list the thoughts they had about the product, and then they learned about the 
source of the report. This procedure ensured that participants in the high credibility 
and low credibility conditions formed the same overall negative opinion about the 
product, which was then validated or invalidated by the source credibility 
information.
Recommendation Credibility Manipulation. In this study, we varied the expertise 
of the recommender to manipulate recommendation credibility, adapting a 
manipulation used by Tormala, Briñol and Petty (2006). Participants in the high 
credibility recommendation condition learned that the information they had just read 
was “taken from a research report produced by an established federal research 
institution that investigates consumer products.” Participants in the low credibility 
recommendation condition read that the information they had just read was “taken 
from a class report written by a local high-school freshman (age 14) who did not 
know anything about detergents before he was assigned to this topic. He wrote it the 
night before it was due, without checking a lot of references or the validity of his 
sources.” 
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Correction Manipulation. We used the same correction manipulation as in study 
1. In the no correction condition, participants answered the questions immediately 
after reading the expertise manipulation. In the correction condition, participants 
responded to the manipulation checks and then read the correction manipulation on 
the following screen: “In the next section, you will be asked to answer several 
questions about these detergents. It is very important that your answers be based on 
your own opinion of the detergents, rather than anyone else’s opinion,” and then 
continued the study.
Measures. The perceived expertise of the recommender was measured using two 
items: “How much expertise do you think the producer of the report has on the 
topic?,” with scale end points ranging from one (the producer of the report is not an 
expert at all) to seven (the producer of the report is an expert), and “How much 
knowledge does the producer of the report have about phosphate detergent?,” with 
scale end points ranging from one (the producer of the report does not know anything 
about it) to seven (the producer of the report knows a lot about it). 
We used the same items as in study 1 to measure judgment certainty and 
behavioral intentions as well as attitudes. Again, we ran a confirmatory factor 
analysis to assess whether attitudes and behavioral intentions were distinct measures. 
The attitude and behavioral intentions items loaded on different factors with over 
92% of the variance explained.
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Results
Manipulation Checks. Suggesting that our expertise manipulation indeed induced
recommendation credibility, only the main effect of the manipulation on the expertise 
index (α = .95) was significant in a 2 (recommendation credibility) x 2 (correction) 
ANOVA (F(1, 242) = 490.78, p < .001; η2 = .67). As predicted, participants perceived 
the research institution to have more expertise than the high-school student (Mhigh 
credibility = 4.92, Mlow credibility = 1.86). Table 1.2 reports the means by condition.
Judgment Certainty. A 2 (recommendation credibility) x 2 (correction) ANOVA 
with the judgment certainty index (α = .74) as the dependent variable revealed a main 
effect of recommendation credibility (F(1, 242) = 101.95, p < .001; η2 = .30). 
Supporting H1a, participants were more certain of their judgments when they 
received the high credibility recommendation than when they received the low 
credibility recommendation (Mhigh credibility =.69, Mlow credibility = 2.91). Consistent with 
H2, this main effect was qualified by the predicted interaction between 
recommendation credibility and correction (F(1, 242) = 9.93, p < .01; η2 = .04). 
Providing support for the bidirectional effect of correction on judgment certainty, 
planned contrasts show that correction decreased certainty in the high credibility 
recommendation condition (Mhigh credibility = 5.01, Mlow credibility = 4.37; F(1, 242) = 6.18, 
p < .01; η2 = .03), and increased certainty in the low credibility recommendation 




Behavioral Intentions. A 2 (recommendation credibility) x 2 (correction) 
ANOVA with behavioral intentions ( = .86) as the dependent variable revealed a 
main effect of recommendation credibility (F(1, 242) = 9.72, p < .01; η2 = .04). 
Supporting H1b, participants complied with the recommendation more and had less
favorable behavioral intentions toward phosphate detergents when they received the 
high credibility recommendation than when they received the low credibility 
recommendation (Mhigh credibility = 2.22, Mlow credibility = 2.65). More importantly, and
consistent with H3, this main effect was qualified by the predicted interaction 
between recommendation credibility and correction on behavioral intentions (F(1, 
242) = 11.75, p < .01 ; η2 = .05). Planned contrasts indicate that correction increased 
behavioral intentions toward phosphate detergents when participants received the 
high credibility recommendation (Mhigh credibility = 1.95, Mlow credibility = 2.49; F(1, 242) 
= 7.35, p < .01; η2 = .03) but decreased behavioral intentions toward phosphate 
detergents when participants received the low credibility recommendation (Mhigh 
credibility = 2.86, Mlow credibility = 2.45; F(1, 242) = 4.52, p < .05; η
2 = .02, see figure 4).
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Figure 4 - Behavioral Intentions toward Recommended Product (Negative 
Recommendation
Attitudes. As expected, attitudes toward phosphate detergent were negative (M = 
2.56) and significantly lower than the scale midpoint (F(1, 245) = 319.34, p < .01). A 
2 (recommendation credibility) x 2 (correction) ANOVA with attitudes as the 
dependent variable revealed a main effect of credibility (F(1, 242) = 4.53, p < .05; η2 
= .02) and an interaction between recommendation credibility and correction (F(1, 
242) = 7.67, p < .01; η2 = .03). The pattern of this interaction is consistent with the 
effects of recommendation credibility and correction on behavioral intentions. 
Contrasts indicate that attitudes increased in the high credibility condition (F(1, 242) 
= 4.06, p < .05; η2 = .02) and marginally decreased in the low credibility condition 
(F(1, 242) = 3.61, p < .06; η2 = .02). In the next section, we discuss the relationships 
among attitudes, certainty and behavioral intentions in this study. 
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Table 1.2 - Means (and Standard Deviations) of Dependent Measures as a Function of 













Expertise 5.02 (1.29) 1.99 (1.17) 4.82 (1.06) 1.72 (.78)
Judgment 
certainty
5.01 (1.35) 2.67 (1.34) 4.37 (1.55) 3.15 (1.29)
Behavioral 
intentions
1.95 (.91) 2.86 (1.15) 2.49 (1.17) 2.45 (1.10)
Attitudes 2.16 (1.17) 2.93 (1.27) 2.62 (1.33) 2.51 (1.20)
N 58 60 60 68
Mediation Analysis. In study 1, we showed that when the recommendation is
positive, judgment certainty has a positive impact on behavioral intentions. In this 
study, judgment certainty should equally mediate the relationship between 
recommendation credibility and behavioral intentions, but the relationship between 
judgment certainty and behavioral intentions should be negative. Following the same 
procedure we used in study 1 (Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt 2005), in the first regression 
we included recommendation credibility, correction, and the interaction between 
recommendation credibility and correction as predictors of behavioral intentions, and 
both recommendation credibility (β = -.217, SE = .070, t = -3.12, p < .01) and the 
interaction between recommendation credibility and correction affected the dependent 
variable (β = .238, SE = .070, t = 3.43, p < .01). In the second regression, the same 
independent variables were included as predictors of the mediating variable judgment 
certainty. We found that recommendation credibility (β = .892, SE = .088, t = 10.09, 
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p < .001) and the interaction between recommendation credibility and correction 
affected judgment certainty (β = -.279, SE = .088, t = -3.15, p < .005). In the third 
regression, recommendation credibility, correction, judgment certainty, the 
interaction between recommendation credibility and correction, and the interaction 
between certainty and correction were included as predictors of behavioral intentions. 
We found that the mediator variable judgment certainty affected behavioral intentions 
negatively (β = -.400, SE = .044, t = -9.09, p < .001) and that the effect of the 
interaction between recommendation credibility and correction became non 
significant (β = .11, SE = .073, t = 1.55, p > .12). The effect of recommendation 
credibility became marginal (β = .14, SE = .073, t = 1.96, p > .05) and, as expected by 
the mediated moderation hypothesis, the effect of the interaction between certainty 
and correction was non-significant (p > .73). Supporting H4, a Sobel test provides 
support for the mediation by judgment certainty (z = 2.98, p < .001). 
To account for the effect of attitudes, we conducted one additional regression 
including attitude in the model. We found that judgment certainty remained a 
significant predictor of behavioral intentions (β = -.153, SE = .035, t = -4.37, p < .01), 
even when attitude is included in the model (β = .59, SE = .039, t = 15.46, p < .01).
Thus, judgment certainty seems to have a direct effect on behavioral intentions over 
and above the effect of attitudes on compliance with the recommendation.
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Discussion
The results of study 2 provide additional support for the bidirectional effect of 
correction on judgment certainty and behavioral intentions. We replicated the results 
of study 1 with two important changes in the stimuli, namely a manipulation of 
recommendation credibility via source expertise and a negative recommendation 
about the product. Study 2 provides additional support for the direct impact of 
judgment certainty on compliance with a recommendation by showing that when
attitudes toward a product are negative, judgment certainty mediates the interactive 
effect of recommendation credibility and correction on behavioral intentions.
Studies 1 and 2 both provide support for the process mechanism of certainty by 
showing that judgment certainty significantly mediates the effect of recommendation 
credibility and correction on behavioral intentions. However, it is possible that our 
manipulations of recommendation credibility, which were designed to create either a
high or low level of judgment certainty (H1a), are also affecting other constructs such 
as source likeability. In study 3, we control for source characteristics by manipulating 
participants’ initial level of certainty directly via subliminal priming, ruling out 
source perceptions as an explanation for our results.  
Study 3: Direct Manipulation of Certainty
The primary goal of study 3 is to provide further insight into the role of certainty 
in our framework. In studies 1 and 2, we show that recommendation credibility 
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influences judgment certainty, which, in turn, influences behavioral intentions. In 
study 3, we directly manipulate participants’ initial level of certainty by subliminally 
priming either certainty or uncertainty while holding the description of the 
recommender constant. Based on previous research, we assume that if everything else 
is held constant and participants are not aware of the cause of the feeling, primed 
feelings of (un)certainty should carry over to their judgments (Clore and Parrot 1994). 
Consistent with our framework, a positive recommendation associated with certainty 
should produce greater compliance than the same positive recommendation 
associated with uncertainty. Thus, we predict that in the no correction condition, 
behavioral intentions will be more positive when participants are primed with 
certainty (vs. uncertainty). 
However, if correction prompts bidirectional adjustments based on how the 
recommendation makes participants feel, those who are initially certain should 
become less certain, but those who are initially uncertain should become more certain
after correction. This should be true even if participants are not consciously aware of 
how certain the recommendation made them feel, and this should be reflected on 
participants’ compliance with the recommendation. Therefore, we expect an 
interaction between initial certainty and correction on behavioral intentions. 
H5: Correction instructions will decrease compliance with a recommendation 




Study 3 employed a 2 initial certainty (certain vs. uncertain) x 2 correction (no-
correction vs. correction) between-subjects design. We manipulated initial certainty 
by priming participants with certainty or uncertainty-related words during a lexical 
decision task. Notably, the product category used in this study, rental apartments, was 
more familiar to our participants than the phosphate detergent that was recommended 
in studies 1 and 2. Greater familiarity should reduce the degree to which participants 
are influenced by product information learned during the study (Bettman, Luce and 
Payne 2008). 
One hundred sixty-seven marketing students participated in the experiment as 
part of a one-hour session in which they completed several studies in exchange for 
extra credit. After removing subjects who had an exceptionally high error rate on the 
lexical decision task (five mistakes across the 32 trials; Fazio 1990; Puntoni and 
Tavassoli 2007; Ratcliff 1993) and the remaining cases with latencies faster than 300 
ms or slower than 2000 ms (Bargh and Chartrand 2000), our final sample was one 
hundred twenty-three marketing students. Neither the error rate (χ2 = .19, p > .4) nor 
the latencies beyond acceptable speed (χ2 = 5.00, p > .2) were related to participants’ 
assigned conditions, meaning that the removed cases were well distributed across 
conditions.
Certainty Manipulation. To manipulate initial certainty, we subliminally exposed 
participants to certainty or uncertainty-related words. Participants were led to believe 
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that they were participating in two unrelated studies. The first task, consisting of the 
certainty manipulation, was a lexical decision task in which they had to identify as 
quickly and accurately as possible whether a stimulus presented on a desktop 
computer was a word or a non-word (using the “z” and the “/” keys). Before the 
actual task, participants completed six practice trials with no prime (Fazio 1990). At 
the beginning of each trial, a fixation point (“***”) appeared at the center of a white 
screen for 2 seconds to show participants where to focus their attention. The fixation 
point was replaced by a 16-point-black-font prime word. Primes consisted of certainty 
or uncertainty-related words and were presented in randomized order for each 
participant. Certainty-related words were: confident, sure, convinced, certain, 
positive, definite, correct, and decisive. Uncertainty-related words were: insecure, 
unsure, doubtful, uncertain, hesitant, vague, wrong, ambivalent. 
The primes were presented for 50 ms and then were replaced by a masking letter 
string (xvxvxvxv) that did not convey any additional meaning and was at least equal 
in length to the prime to ensure that the prime would not reach the threshold of 
conscious perception. The backward mask was then replaced by the target word, 
which appeared in the same location after a very brief delay varying randomly in 
duration (from 250 to 750 ms) to avoid participants anticipating the target’s 
appearance. Targets were neutral words (e.g., house, planet, carpet, river, building, 
hat, window, ranch) or non-words (e.g., blater, campure, dight, lench, measing, 
nesion, poit, reesy). Targets appeared until participants registered their response. A 
combination of two blocks, eight primes, four words and four non-words yielded 32 
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trials (each prime was presented twice, once with a word and once with a non-word). 
After each target, a blank screen was presented for 1500 ms.
A pretest was conducted to test the efficacy of the priming (N = 32). Because 
certainty was induced subliminally, we did not expect to capture its effect in reported 
measures, though we expected to capture its effect in our dependent measure of 
behavioral intentions. This prediction is based on empirical evidence that feelings can 
be elicited subliminally, not be captured with reported measures, and still influence 
behavior (Winkielman and Berridge 2004). Therefore, to test whether the certainty 
primes were effective, we looked at participants’ reaction times in the lexical decision 
task. Previous research indicates that certainty is related to faster responses (Bargh 
1989; Gross et al. 1995). Indeed, we found that participants primed with certainty (vs. 
uncertainty)-related words responded marginally faster in the lexical decision task 
(Mcertainty = 780.00 ms, SD = 270.46 vs. Muncertainty = 1021.07 ms, SD = 344.85; F(1, 
24) = 3.83, p < .06), after removing outliers with an excessive number of error rates 
(Fazio 1990) and cases with latencies faster than 300 ms or slower than 2000 ms 
(Bargh and Chartrand 2000). As an awareness check, we presented five of the 
subliminal stimuli again at the end of the pretest, told participants that words were 
being presented, and asked them to guess what those words were (Bargh and 
Chartrand 2000). None of the participants could identify any of the primed words, 
indicating that the subliminal priming was indeed subliminal. 
After exposure to the certainty primes, participants proceeded to the next task 
and read a scenario in which they were looking for an apartment to rent. They were 
told that they had narrowed their options down to two apartments and that a realtor 
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had recommended the nicer but more expensive apartment. The scenario can be found 
in appendix C. 
Correction Manipulation. In the no correction condition, participants responded 
to the dependent measures immediately after reading the scenario; in the correction 
condition, participants read an instruction adapted from Wegener and Petty (1995) 
before responding to the dependent measures: “In the next section, please be sure that 
the realtor’s opinion will not influence your own opinion. It is very important that 
your answers be based on your own opinion of the apartments.”
Measures. The primary dependent measure was behavioral intentions, 
captured with a relative measure of preference ranging from one to seven (“I prefer 
apartment 1/apartment 2”). We also measured overall attitude with the same relative 
item we used in studies 1 and 2. 
We did not measure judgment certainty for two reasons. First, we did not 
expect an effect on a reported measure (Winkielman and Berridge 2004). Second, 
measuring certainty might affect the nature of the judgment process and create a 
demand for participants to respond according to their certainty judgments (Petrusic 
and Baranski 2003). If participants must be aware of their certainty for its effects on 
behavioral intentions to emerge, the generalizability of the findings would be limited. 
By manipulating recommendation certainty subliminally and not including a reported 
measure of judgment certainty, study 3 provides a compelling test of the effect with a 
clean manipulation of recommendation certainty.
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Finally, to help rule out participants’ mood as an alternative explanation, we 
included mood measures adapted from the Positive Affect Negative Affect Scales 
(Watson et al. 1988). Participants read thirteen words describing emotions and were 
asked to rate the extent to which each of those words described their feelings at that 
moment. Scales ranged from 1 (“Does not describe my current feeling at all”) to 7 
(“Describes my current feelings very well”).
Results
Manipulation Check. Consistent with the pretest and confirming the efficacy of 
the certainty manipulation, a one-way (certainty vs. uncertainty) ANOVA shows that 
participants primed with certainty-related words responded marginally faster to the 
lexical decision task than participants primed with uncertainty-related words (Mcertainty
= 816.71 ms, SD = 221.73 and Muncertainty = 902.07 ms, SD = 276.20; F(1, 121) = 
3.60, p < .06; η2 = .029). 
Behavioral Intentions. Participants’ behavioral intentions were analyzed with a 2 
(recommendation validity) x 2 (correction) ANOVA. Supporting H5, we found a 
significant interaction between initial certainty and correction (F(1, 119) = 11.83, p < 
.001; η2 = .09). In the no correction condition participants in the certainty condition 
had more favorable behavioral intentions towards the recommended apartment than 
participants in the uncertainty condition (Mcertainty = 5.13 and Muncertainty = 3.97; F(1, 
119) = 9.64, p < .01; η2 = .08). However, this effect was marginally reversed when 
participants were instructed to correct (Mcertainty = 4.14 and Muncertainty = 4.83; F(1, 
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119) = 3.19, p < .07; η2 = .03). Providing support for the bidirectional effect of 
correction on behavioral intentions depending on the initial level of certainty 
associated with the recommendation, planned contrasts show that preferences for the 
recommended apartment decreased when initial certainty was high (F(1, 119) = 6.53, 
p < .01; η2 = .05) and increased when initial certainty was low (F(1, 119) = 5.31, p < 
.02; η2 = .04; see figure 5). Table 1.3 reports the means by condition.
Figure 5 - Behavioral Intentions toward Recommended Product (Positive 
Recommendation)
Attitudes and Mood. A 2 (recommendation certainty) x 2 (correction) ANOVA 
with attitudes toward the product as the dependent variable revealed a marginal 
interaction (F(1, 119) = 3.63, p < .06; η2 = .03). Contrasts suggest that this marginal 
interaction was primarily driven by a decrease in attitudes after correction in the 
certainty condition (F(1, 119) = 5.06, p < .05; η2 = .04). Attitudes did not differ 
significantly across correction in either uncertainty condition (p > .68). This suggests, 
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consistent with the previous studies, that changes in attitude cannot fully explain the 
effect of certainty on behavioral intentions and is consistent with the notion that 
recommendations affect primarily consumers’ preferences rather than consumers’ 
opinions about the product. To analyze the effect of attitude more closely, we 
conducted regression analyses to examine whether the effect of correction on 
behavioral intentions was mediated by attitude, following the same method used in 
studies 1 and 2 (Muller et al. 2005). In the first regression, the effect of the interaction 
between initial certainty and correction was significant on behavioral intentions (β = 
.465, SE = .13; t = 3.44, p < .001). In the second regression, the effect of the 
interaction was marginally significant on attitudes (β = 1.207, SE = .63; t = 1.91, p < 
.06). In the third regression and not surprisingly (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), the effect 
of attitudes was significant on behavioral intentions (β = .566, SE = .06; t = 9.34, p < 
.001), but because the effect of the interaction between initial certainty and correction 
was still significant (β = 1.187, SE = .42; t = 2.84, p < .005), we cannot conclude that 
attitudes fully mediate the effect of the certainty primes on behavioral intentions.
To examine the role of mood, we ran a factor analysis with the 13 affect items 
and found support for three factors. We created indices of positive mood (α = .86; 
happy, enthusiastic, excited, and proud), negative mood (α = .84; afraid, sad, 
depressed, upset, and irritable), and anxiety (α = .83; anxious, tense, distressed, and 
nervous). None of these indices showed significant effects (all p > .47) when entered 
as dependent variables in a 2 (source) x 2 (correction) ANOVA. Therefore, 
participants’ mood does not seem to provide an alternative explanation for our 
effects.
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Table 1.3 - Means (and Standard Deviations) of Dependent Measures as a Function of 
Certainty and Correction
Dependent measure No-correction Correction
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Certainty Uncertainty Certainty Uncertainty
Behavioral 
intentions
5.13 (1.50) 3.97 (1.71) 4.14 (1.38) 4.83 (1.32)
Attitudes 4.23 (1.72) 3.35 (1.70) 3.21 (1.57) 3.53 (1.99)
N 30 34 29 30
Discussion
The results of study 3 provide insight into the role of certainty. By looking at 
certainty in isolation from other source factors that may also influence compliance 
and confound the results, we provide additional support for the notion that correction 
processes may operate via consumers’ certainty. First, we showed that certainty 
influences behavioral intentions directly. Although all participants received the same 
supraliminal recommendation, the subliminal certainty primes successfully influenced 
participants’ behavioral intentions toward the recommended product. Participants 
indicated more positive behavioral intentions towards the recommended apartment 
when they were primed with certainty-related words than when they were primed 
with uncertainty-related words. Supporting H5, when participants corrected for the 
influence of the recommendation, compliance with the recommendation decreased 
when initial certainty was high, but increased when initial certainty was low. These 
results suggest that the bidirectional adjustments prompted by correction can emerge 
simply based on how certain a recommendation makes consumers feel, rather than 
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based on (conscious) lay theories of how the persuasion attempt influences 
consumers.
General Discussion
In this paper, we demonstrate that correction has a bidirectional effect on 
certainty and behavioral intentions. The effect holds across two different product 
categories with conceptually different levels of familiarity and involvement, 
phosphate detergents (studies 1 and 2) and apartments (study 3). We also demonstrate 
the generality of the effect by varying the source of the recommendation across 
studies. In study 1, the recommenders were a federal consumer agency and a 
manufacturer, in study 2, the recommenders were a research institution and a high-
school student, and, in study 3, the recommender was a realtor. In studies 1 and 2, we 
manipulated judgment certainty indirectly by manipulating source credibility as 
source trustworthiness in study 1 and as source expertise in study 2. In both of these 
studies, we showed that judgment certainty mediated the effect of source credibility 
and correction on behavioral intentions. In study 3, we manipulated certainty directly 




The first contribution of this research is showing that correction can have 
different effects on judgment certainty depending on how consumers appraise the 
persuasion attempt. Previous research has suggested that correction may decrease 
certainty (Tormala et al. 2007), but we provide support for a bidirectional effect. 
Specifically, when consumers receive a high credibility recommendation, creating a 
high level of initial certainty about the recommendation, reminding them to correct 
their judgments makes them less certain about their judgments. In contrast, when 
consumers receive a low credibility recommendation, creating a low level of initial 
certainty about their judgments, the effect of correction is reversed and they become 
more certain about their judgments. 
Integrating the correction and certainty literatures, we propose that this 
bidirectional effect of correction on judgment certainty happens because correction 
motivates consumers to observe their reactions to a persuasive attempt (Briñol et al. 
2004), and consumers correct their judgments based on how they perceive they were 
influenced (Wegener and Petty 1995). Thus, they may lose certainty (Tormala et al. 
2006, 2007) or gain certainty (Tormala and Petty 2002) depending upon the 
credibility of the recommendation and their initial reactions to it. Our theory is 
consistent with Tormala and colleagues’ results (2007) by showing that correction 
can decrease certainty when consumers rely on a high credibility recommendation, 
and it also extends their work by showing that when a recommendation is low in 
credibility, correction may increase certainty. 
The second contribution of this research is showing that changes in certainty can 
directly influence consumers’ behavioral intentions. While previous research has 
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focused on how certainty can strengthen or weaken the relationship between attitudes 
and behavioral intentions (Tormala and Petty 2002, 2004b), we go one step further 
and show that in the context of compliance with product recommendations, 
behavioral intentions can change directly as a function of judgment certainty, which 
contributes to persuasion research (Tormala and Petty, 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Tormala 
et al. 2006). 
Third, this research contributes to the judgment correction literature (Wegener 
and Petty 1995) by suggesting a new process mechanism through which correction 
operates to influence judgments. We show that when consumers are asked to correct, 
correction may not change their perceptions about the recommendation or the 
recommender, but changes in judgment certainty resulting from correction are an 
important predictor of behavioral intentions. It is possible that at least some of the 
research done on judgment correction can be explained in terms of certainty. In 
studies testing the flexible correction model, Wegener and Petty encouraged 
participants to form a naïve theory of either assimilation or contrast regarding how 
the context would influence their judgments. For example, participants were asked to 
think about the weather in Hawaii and rate either people’s job satisfaction in Hawaii 
(which should produce assimilation) or the desirability of the weather in Midwestern 
cities such as Indianapolis (which should produce contrast). As another example, 
participants were asked to think about attractive models and rate either the desirability 
of products endorsed by these attractive women (assimilation) or their perceptions of 
an average-looking woman (contrast). Wegener and Petty show that participants 
corrected in the direction opposite to their lay theories. It is possible that lay theories 
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of assimilation induce greater certainty than lay theories of contrast. According to 
Martin’s (1986) set/reset model, assimilation is the default response to social 
influence, and Pelham and Wachsmuth (1995) have shown that social assimilation 
occurs when individuals are highly certain about their perceptions. If this is the case, 
an effect of correction on certainty may have been found if measures of certainty had 
been included in these studies. Our results show that judgment certainty is one of the 
mechanisms through which correction operates, so it would be interesting for future 
research to investigate other situations in which judgment certainty mediates 
correction processes.
Limitations and Future Research
The manipulation and timing of correction. One limitation of this research is that 
all of our studies used explicit instructions to manipulate correction. While these 
correction manipulations were successful in changing judgment certainty and 
behavioral intentions, it would be interesting to examine whether these variables 
could be changed by a different manipulation of correction. For example, other 
situational or chronic variables such as activation of persuasion knowledge (Campbell 
and Kirmani 2008) also motivate consumers to observe their reactions to persuasive 
attempts, and may have similar effects on judgment certainty and behavioral 
intentions. Nevertheless, based on previous research, we would expect that other 
manipulations of correction or discount information would produce the same results 
(Wegener and Petty 1997).
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In our studies, instructions to correct were given after participants had formed 
judgments about the product. It is reasonable to consider whether the effect of 
correction might have been different if instructions to correct were given before 
judgments about the product had been formed. That is, if giving instructions to 
correct judgments before message exposure motivates consumers to be less 
susceptible to persuasion attempts (Wood and Quinn 2003), correction might make 
consumer judgments less vulnerable to change. 
Other Manipulations of Certainty. While studies 1 and 2 show that the credibility 
of the recommender influences consumers’ judgment certainty and behavioral 
intentions, study 3 manipulates certainty directly and shows an effect on behavioral 
intentions. Based on these results, we may expect other manipulations of certainty to 
have similar effects on behavioral intentions. For example, emotions that carry the 
appraisal of certainty (e.g., anger) or uncertainty (e.g., fear) could potentially 
influence behavioral intentions differently following a product recommendation 
(Tiedens and Linton 2001). As another example, there is evidence that the number of 
repeated recommendations influences consumers’ certainty (Thomas and Menon 
2007). Specifically, if a product being sold on a website receives multiple peer 
recommendations, consumers should be more certain of their judgments about the 
product than if the product shows only one peer recommendation. Therefore, 
increasing the number of recommendations on a website may be another way to 
influence consumers’ judgment certainty and behavioral intentions.
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Another interesting situation is when the recommendation conflicts with initial 
impressions. In the present research, we induced a positive or negative attitude 
towards the products within the studies so that the recommendations were always 
consistent with the judgments about the product. However, if a recommendation is 
inconsistent with consumers’ initial opinions (e.g., if a recommendation favors a 
product that the consumer does not like), the recommendation may be perceived as 
invalid and may produce uncertainty. Fitzsimons and Lehmann (2004) have shown 
that when a recommendation is inconsistent with consumers’ initial opinions, 
consumers not only ignore the recommendation but will select alternatives that 
contradict the recommendation. 
Boundary Conditions. Individual differences may moderate the effects we 
have shown here. For example, research suggests that consumers high in need for
closure (Webster and Kruglanski 1994) rely more on heuristic cues such as the 
characteristics of the source. Additionally, when reminded to correct their judgments, 
these consumers may correct to a greater extent than low need for closure consumers 
to make sure that they will account for the influence of the recommendation. Thus, 
we may expect stronger effects of both recommendation credibility and correction for 
high need for closure consumers. It would be interesting to examine the effect of need 
for closure and other individual difference variables that may affect correction 
processes such as the level of elaboration or desire for control in future research.
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Managerial Implications
By showing that when consumers correct for external influences on their 
judgments, they may actually comply with a recommendation they initially resisted 
(e.g., a recommendation delivered by a low credibility source), we raise the intriguing 
possibility that correction might be used by marketers to increase consumers’
willingness to follow their recommendations. In theory, it should not matter how 
consumers’ correction processes are activated: by the experimenter’s instructions in a 
lab setting (as in our studies), by cues in the environment (e.g., a posted reminder to 
consumers from the Federal Trade Commission not to be influenced by salespeople), 
or by advertising delivered by the recommender such as in our opening example. 
Therefore, the “don’t take our word for it” advertising might make consumers more 
confident of their judgments and subtly increase the likelihood that they will comply 
with a recommendation from a low credibility recommender like a manufacturer. Our 
results suggest that correction may be a useful tactic for increasing compliance with
recommendations delivered by low credibility agents or by sources associated with 
uncertainty. One caveat, however, is that we have not explored the effects of 
managing consumers’ certainty over a series of repeated transactions or in the context 
of long-term marketing relationships. Thus, we suggest caution before generalizing 
our findings to contexts in which repeated transactions are important.
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Chapter 2: Essay 2 – Motivated Valuation: A Motivational Perspective on the 
Disparity between Buying and Selling Prices
Introduction
It is well known that selling prices are often larger than buying prices for the 
same product. The disparity between buying and selling prices, also known as the 
endowment effect (Thaler 1980), refers to the finding that individuals tend to ask for 
a higher price when they are giving up an item as opposed to when they are acquiring 
it. This effect has been widely investigated in economics (e.g., Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler 1990), psychology (e.g., Van Boven, Dunning, and Loewenstein 2000), 
and marketing (for a recent review, see Ariely, Huber, and Wertenbroch 2005). The 
disparity between buying and selling prices is seen as an “economic anomaly” 
because the amount the consumer is willing to exchange for a good should reflect the 
value for the consumer on having that item, and therefore, controlling for economic 
factors such as transaction costs or income effects, the normative prediction is that 
buying and selling prices should be equal (Willig 1976). Because buying and selling 
prices are commonly used as measures of value and the disparity is in conflict with 
standard economic theory (Horowitz, McConnell, and Quiggin 1999), it is important 
to understand the factors affecting buying and selling prices and thereby the disparity 
between the two.
48
Loss aversion is perhaps the most accepted psychological explanation for the 
effect (Ariely et al. 2005; Brenner et al. 2007). The notion of loss aversion derives
from prospect theory’s value function which, being steeper in the loss domain, 
suggests that the pain of a loss is greater than the pleasure of an equivalent gain 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Consequently, the amount of pain due to giving up 
(selling) an item is greater than the amount of pleasure experienced in gaining it 
(buying), and this increases the value of the object for an individual who owns it. This 
overvaluation of the same object by the sellers leads to a discrepancy in buying and 
selling prices or the endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). Loss 
aversion has been extended to embrace buyers’ loss aversion as well and suggests that 
both sellers and buyers are loss averse and focus on what they are giving up. While 
sellers are giving up the product, buyers are giving up the money that they have to 
pay to acquire the new item (Carmon and Ariely 2000).
However, in a recent meta-analysis, the disparity between buying and selling 
prices was found to be reduced, but not eliminated, when the cognitive foci of buyers 
and sellers was salient to all participants or when the buying and selling tasks were 
framed as a gain (Sayman and Öncüler 2005). Further, in many situations the 
economic explanation based on substitutability has been shown to be a better 
explanation than loss aversion (Horowitz et al. 1999). As such, while loss aversion is 
the dominant explanation for the disparity in buying and selling prices, it does not 
capture all factors because the focus is only on what is being foregone or given up,
while what one is getting seems to be of less importance.
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In this paper, we examine an alternative explanation for the price disparity 
effect by proposing that buyers and sellers differ in their intrinsic motivations and 
these different motivations leads to the disparity in buying and selling prices. When 
adopting the role of a buyer or a seller, individuals adopt the respective socially 
ingrained task goals such that they are motivated to do their best in the transaction 
and are pre-disposed to behave accordingly (Buss 1995; Friedman 2005). We argue 
that as a consequence of their respective intrinsic goals, buyers and sellers have 
different motivations regarding the aspects of the transaction that they may focus on. 
Specifically, we suggest that in many transactions, buyers are predominantly 
concerned with what they are giving up whereas sellers are predominantly concerned 
with what they are getting (note that while loss aversion may also be conceived of as 
a goal, loss aversion would account for the buyers but not for the sellers as per our 
conceptualization). As such, buyers’ primary motivation is to minimize what they 
give up whereas sellers’ primary motivation is to maximize what they are getting. 
Since most modern transactions involve money, our conceptualization 
suggests that while buyers will be motivated to minimize the money they are willing 
to give up, sellers will be motivated to maximize the money they are willing to get. 
This idea gains more traction when one recognizes that while the product side of the 
transaction is generally not mutable (even if product perceptions may be biased), the 
money side of the transaction is mutable. Notwithstanding most transactions that 
involve money, our basic argument is that when individuals adopt social roles, goals 
and goal-congruent cognition and behavior are automatically activated (Ferguson, 
Hassin, and Bargh 2008) and that buyers are primarily concerned with what they are 
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giving up and thus are motivated to minimize that, whereas sellers are primarily 
concerned with what they are getting and thus are motivated to maximize that.
Providing evidence for the different motivations as a function of the social 
role of a buyer or seller adds to previous research on the price disparity effect (e.g., 
Carmon and Ariely 2000; Kahneman et al. 1990; Nayakankuppam and Mishra 2005) 
in at least two ways. First, we show that buyers are concerned with what they are 
giving up, whereas sellers are concerned with what they are getting. While the current 
explanations based on loss aversion can account for buyers’ motivation to minimize 
what they are giving up, they cannot fully account for sellers’ motivation to maximize 
what they are getting. Second, we show that the different motivations of buyers and 
sellers, beyond their mere cognitive focus on aspects related to the transaction, lead to 
a disparity in buying and selling prices. Besides accounting for the disparity between 
buying and selling prices, the motivated valuation explanation suggests that altering 
the motivations of buyers and sellers should influence their product valuation in 
systematic and predictable ways. To test the motivated valuation hypothesis, we build 
upon goal theory to investigate the intrinsic motivations of buyers and sellers. In sum,
our prediction is that for a given transaction, buyers are motivated to minimize what 
they are giving up whereas sellers are motivated to maximize what they are getting.
We adopt a motivation-as-cognition approach (e.g., Kruglanski et al. 2002), 
which treats motivation as a dynamic construct and, consequently, allows us to alter 
the goal pursuit of buyers and sellers. In a series of 5 studies, we provide support for 
the motivated valuation explanation. Study 1 shows that buyers and sellers approach
the transaction with different motivational mindsets and that loss aversion cannot 
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fully account for all of the findings. Study 2 shows that the role of a buyer activates 
the goal of minimization and the role of a seller activates the goal of maximization. 
Study 3 shows that priming “give up” or “get” to neutral traders conceptually 
reproduces the price disparity effect. Studies 4 and 5 investigate factors that moderate 
goal pursuit. In study 4 we manipulate alternative goals and in study 5 we manipulate 
goal fluency, each of which should facilitate or inhibit goal pursuit, and reproduce or 
eliminate the price disparity effect.
Theoretical Background
The Price Disparity Effect
The discrepancy in buying and selling prices is one of the most robust 
economic anomalies. It has been found with unimportant items such as mugs (Thaler 
1980) or items that are more relevant to consumers (Carmon and Ariely 2000). It has 
been found when consumers actually possess the item (Thaler 1980), when they are 
asked to look at the object (Lin, Chuang, and Kung 2006), when they are asked to 
imagine they have the object (Carmon and Ariely 2000), or when they simply develop 
a mental endowment (Carmon, Wertenbroch, and Zeelenberg 2003). The effect is also 
externally valid, as it has been shown that consumers buying and selling stocks tend 
to ask for a higher price when they are selling the stocks, even if they are aware of the 
market price (Furche and Johnstone 2006).
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Although other psychological explanations for the price disparity effect have 
been proposed (for a review, see Sayman and Öncüler 2005)1, loss aversion is 
perhaps the most accepted explanation for the effect (Brenner et al. 2007). Because 
the loss incurred by parting with something (the pain of a loss) exceeds the gain of 
acquiring it (the pleasure of an equivalent gain), it is natural to demand more to 
compensate the loss (Thaler 1980). This approach suggests that the discrepancy in 
buying and selling prices is primarily driven by an increase in selling prices due to the 
experience of loss aversion when sellers are endowed with the object (Kahneman, 
Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). Importantly, though, neither ownership nor out-of-pocket 
payments are necessary for this price disparity to emerge (Carmon and Ariely 2000;
Sayman and Öncüler 2005). 
Current interpretations of loss aversion in the price disparity effect build on 
the notion that individuals are generally more concerned with the loss rather than the 
gain consequences of their actions, and it is their motivation to minimize losses rather 
than their motivation to maximize gains that is responsible for the discrepancy (Zhang 
and Fishbach 2005). Specifically, it is buyers’ concern with losing their money and 
sellers’ concern with losing an object that is responsible for the effect. Loss aversion 
has been found to lead to differences in information processing (Carmon and Ariely 
2000; Nayakankuppam and Mishra 2005), and anticipated negative affect (Zhang and 
Fishbach 2005). While loss aversion explains why items perceived as a loss are given 
more or less value, factors such as emotional attachment to an object (Carmon et al. 
                                                
1 Alternative psychological explanations for the effect include uncertainty of the value of the good and 
irreversibility of transactions (Zhao and Kling 2001), participants’ misconceptions of experimental 
tasks (Plott and Zeiler 2005), or bargaining habits that can induce participants to understate their 
willingness to pay and overstate their willingness to accept (Knez, Smith, and Williams 1985).
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2003; Peters, Slovic, and Gregory 2003), attractiveness of the item (Brenner et al. 
2007), associated negative emotions (Lerner, Small and Loewenstein 2004), 
ownership history (Strahilevitz and Loewenstein 1998), arbitrary or non-arbitrary 
reference prices (Nunes and Boatwright 2004; Simonson and Drolet 2004) and 
intention to trade (Novemsky and Kahneman 2005) are thought to moderate loss 
aversion by altering the degree to which giving up an item is perceived as a loss 
(Ariely et al. 2005). 
One important explanation for the price disparity effect, changes in cognitive 
perspective, is an evolution of the loss aversion framework. The cognitive perspective 
account proposes that the price disparity effect can be explained by different 
cognitive foci adopted by buyers and sellers. Carmon and Ariely (2000) propose that 
both buyers and sellers focus on what they are “losing” in the transaction. Buyers 
naturally focus on the money that they are giving up, and sellers naturally focus on 
the product that they are giving up. For example, they found that fans buying 
basketball tickets generated more thoughts on alternative uses for their money, while 
fans selling tickets generated more thoughts on the benefits of the game experience. 
According to the authors, these different cognitive foci result in buying-selling price 
disparities. A similar theory also building on different cognitive foci by buyers and 
sellers is proposed by Nayakankuppam and Mishra (2005). They advance the biased-
cognitive-perspective explanation by showing that while buyers attend more to 
negative aspects of the product being traded, sellers attend more to positive aspects. 
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Motivated Valuation
We extend this line of research by proposing that, in many situations, while 
buyers are primarily concerned with what they are giving up in a transaction, sellers 
are primarily concerned with what they are getting in a transaction. We build on the 
economic assumption that behavior can best be predicted by assuming that 
individuals behave in a goal-driven manner (Friedman 2005) to offer a parsimonious 
explanation of why selling prices are often greater than buying prices. We propose 
that buyers and sellers have different motivations and these lead to a discrepancy in 
product valuation. Economic theories assume that individuals have goals, but these 
theories do not specify what those goals are (Friedman 2005). We assume that 
consumers adopt social roles that have the function of solving a problem, and these 
goals drive them in these social roles to generate solutions for these problems (Buss 
1995). It is not necessary that people be aware of either the underlying psychological 
mechanisms or the ultimate functions of goal pursuit, but these different motivations 
lead to different behaviors simply because they have different functions (Buss 1995;
Chartrand, Dalton, and Cheng 2008). By proposing that the goals of buyers and 
sellers affect their product valuation, we extend the understanding of the 
psychological process leading to buying and selling prices disparities. We propose 
that different goals are intrinsically related to the social roles of buyers and sellers. 
On the one hand, buyers are motivated to minimize what they are giving up. On the 
other hand, sellers are motivated to maximize what they are getting. We propose that 
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these are the intrinsic motivations that are activated by the mere adoption of the social 
role of buyer or seller, respectively. 
Contemporary goal theory considers motivation as a type of cognition 
(Kruglanski et al. 2002). This incorporates dynamism into our understanding of 
motivation and is more realistic because motivation often fluctuates from moment to 
moment as individuals succumb to distractions, temptations, and digressions. Three 
properties of goal theory will help us test our hypothesis: Goal activation, the pursuit 
of multiple goals, and goal fluency. We applied these principles to test our hypothesis 
that buyers have the goal of minimizing what they are giving up and sellers have the 
goal of maximizing what they are getting and that these fundamentally different 
motivations of buyers and sellers can account for the disparity between buying and 
selling prices.
Goal activation is a dynamic process because it can be triggered by external 
environmental cues or by people’s innermost motivations (Kruglanski et al. 2002). 
Exposing people to a cue related to a goal will activate that goal and increase its 
impact on subsequent behavior (Van Osselaer et al. 2005). Goals relevant to a social 
role can be automatically activated by cues inherent to the role or its physical or 
social environment (Ferguson, Hassin, and Bargh 2008). Activated goals operate 
based on a variety of mechanisms that allow people to adapt their goal pursuit to 
changing external environments (Fergusson et al. 2008). We propose that the mere 
adoption of the social roles of buyers and sellers will activate different goals and, 
consequently, trigger different product valuations. This notion is investigated in 
studies 1-3.
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Two factors that have been found to moderate goal pursuit are the pursuit of 
multiple goals (Shah et al. 2002) and goal fluency (Labroo and Lee 2006). Each of 
these factors should facilitate or hinder pursuit of a focal goal. Individuals are often 
pursuing several goals concurrently that reflect their current motivations, cognitions, 
and capacities (Shah and Kruglanski 2008). Goals within a context may vary on the 
degree to which they facilitate or hinder other goals, and may also affect how 
vigorously individuals pursue any particular goal or how much effort they put in the 
pursuit of a particular goal. For example, activating an alternative conflicting goal to a 
currently pursued focal goal generally leads to sharing of the resources allocated to 
the focal goal and, consequently, poorer performance, lower commitment, slower 
progress, weaker emotional reactions, or development of fewer means to the focal 
goal (Shah et al. 2002). On the other hand, activating an alternative goal consistent
with a currently pursued goal generally facilitates goal pursuit. The moderating role 
of pursuing alternative goals on the focal buying or selling goal is investigated in 
study 4.
Besides alternative goals, characteristics of the environment may also 
facilitate or hinder goal pursuit (Shah and Kruglanski 2008). Goal fluency (or fit) 
refers to increased ease of processing that occurs when a given stimulus or the 
manner the individual engages in an activity sustains (vs. disrupts) a goal that is 
highly accessible to individuals (Higgins 2000; Labroo and Lee 2006). When the 
stimulus matches the consumer’s goal or when a person’s orientation toward what 
they are doing is being sustained (e.g., when their decision strategy matches with their 
regulatory orientation), high fluency is experienced, and when the stimulus conflicts 
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with the consumer’s goal, low fluency is experienced (Higgins 2008; Labroo and Lee 
2006). This “feeling right” experience (Kruglanski 2006) increases perceived ease 
and speed of processing and increases individuals’ confidence in their reactions 
(Avnet and Higgins 2006; Labroo and Lee 2006; Lee and Aaker 2004). Previous 
research suggests that goal fluency seems to facilitate goal-related behavior and 
enhances the evaluation of a product (Avnet and Higgins 2006) or attitude towards a 
brand (Labroo and Lee 2006). The moderating role of goal fluency on pursuit of 
buying or selling goals is investigated in study 5.
Study 1: Buyers Focus on What They Give Up and Sellers Focus on What They Get
The goal of this study is to explore the factors that buyers and sellers attend to 
during a transaction and investigate the extent to which cognitive focus based on loss 
aversion can account for the price disparity effect. The cognitive perspective 
explanation based on loss aversion suggests that the price disparity effect is due to 
different foci on what is being given up (Carmon and Ariely 2000) or on different 
product attributes (Nayakankuppam and Mishra 2005). If focusing on different 
aspects of the transaction would fully explain the effect, forcing both buyers’ and 
sellers’ attention to all of these aspects should eliminate the effect. If, on the other 
hand, adopting the role of buyers and sellers activates different goals, the price 
disparity effect should emerge even if both buyers and sellers are aware of the aspects 
on which both buyers and sellers cognitively focus during a transaction.
To examine the extent to which the cognitive focus due to loss aversion 
explains the effect, we employed a mixed within-subjects factorial design to make 
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buyers’ and sellers’ foci salient to all participants and collected participants’ 
spontaneous thoughts about the transaction. Each participant first elaborated on 
aspects that are the focus of either buyers or sellers, and immediately after they have 
given their price in the first stage of the study, they elaborated on the aspects that are 
the focus of the other party (either sellers or buyers). Therefore, when participants 
had to state their price in the second stage of the study, the foci of both buyers and 
sellers was salient to each participant because they were just forced to elaborate on 
the aspects to which the other party in the transaction attends. Consistent with the 
findings of a recent meta-analysis, we expect that a within-subjects design will 
attenuate, but not eliminate, the price disparity effect (Sayman and Öncüler 2005). 
We argue that the effect will be reduced because participants’ goals as buyers or 
sellers in the second stage will still lead to a discrepancy in prices, even if they are 
aware of the aspects on which both buyers and sellers focus during a transaction.
Method
We employed a mixed within-subjects factorial design such that all 
participants played both the role of buyer and seller. Order was a between-subjects 
factor and role was within-subjects: half of the participants were the buyer first and 
the seller in the second stage, whereas the other half was the seller first and the buyer 
second. Therefore, the study employed a 2 order (first vs. second) x 2 role (buyer vs. 
seller) mixed design. The effect of role was examined in the first stage of the study 
(when participants played either the role of buyers or sellers), in the second stage 
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(when participants played the other role), and across stages (to examine differences in
price and thoughts when the foci of both buyers and sellers were salient to all 
participants).
One hundred and thirty two marketing students participated in several studies 
grouped in a one-hour session in exchange for extra credit. The study was conducted 
using Medialab® on a desktop computer. When participants arrived at the lab, they 
found a new, black coffee mug at their computer stations. We kept the original price 
tag but masked the price such that participants could see that the mug was new, but 
could not read any price or brand information. Participants were assigned the role of 
buyer [or seller] and read the following instructions: “Please take a moment to look at 
the coffee mug placed in front of you. It is a new black coffee mug which does not 
[does] belong to you. However, you have the option of buying it and taking it home 
with you [selling it for money]. Please indicate the highest price you would be willing 
to pay for the mug [the lowest price you would be willing to sell the mug]. It is very 
important that you give us your true assessment as you will actually have the 
opportunity to buy [sell] the mug at the end of the experimental session. It is in your 
best interest to indicate the price that you are truly willing to pay for [sell] the mug. 
Feel free to touch, feel, and examine the mug.” After reading these instructions 
participants were asked to indicate the price that they would be willing to buy or sell 
the mug. Following this question, participants were asked to write up to six thoughts 
they had about that transaction. This elaboration task should make salient to 
participants the aspects that buyers and sellers focus during the transaction.
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After participants completed this first stage of the study, they received similar 
instructions, but this time they read the following: “Please take a moment again to 
look at the coffee mug placed in front of you. Now assume that the new black coffee 
mug does [does not] belong to you.  However, you have the option of selling it for 
money [buying it and taking it home with you].” Participants who were the buyers in 
the first stage were the sellers in the second stage, and vice-versa. They then indicated 
the price they would be willing to sell the mug or the price they would be willing to 
buy the mug and again were asked to write up to six thoughts they had about that 
transaction. This elaboration task should now make salient the aspects that the other 
party focuses during the transaction, such that at this stage the aspects on which both 
buyers and sellers focus during the transaction should be salient to each participant. 
At the end of the experimental session, participants were thanked and debriefed.
Before analyzing the thoughts, two independent judges blind to the conditions 
and to the research purpose coded the thoughts about the transaction as related to 
money (e.g., “how much I have paid for other mugs” or “I do not have a lot of 
money”), to the product (e.g., “I like the color” or “it is a plain mug”), or to other 
aspects (e.g., “it is harder to sell an item than it is to buy one” or “I would really like a 
nice cup of hot tea right now”). Interjudge reliability for thoughts about the 
transaction was .73. To resolve the inconsistencies, a third independent judge coded 
the disagreeing thoughts. Next, thoughts identified as related to money were recoded 
by two different judges as related to the notion of giving up money (e.g., “I’d rather 
spend my money in other ways”), getting money (e.g., “I want to get the most I can 
out of it”), or general thoughts about money (e.g., “I thought about how much the 
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mug would cost in a store”). Reliability for thoughts about money was .71. All 
thoughts identified as related to the product were recoded as positive (e.g., “I has a 
nice design”), negative (e.g., “uncomfortable handle”, or neutral (e.g., “the color is 
black”). Reliability for thoughts about the product was .70. The inconsistencies were 
resolved by a third judge. These thoughts were counted for each participant, for each 
stage. Therefore, we have measures of number of thoughts in the first stage of the 
study (when participants were either sellers or buyers) and measures of number of 
thoughts in the second stage (when participants played the other role).
Results 
Table 2.1 presents the means of the dependent measures for buyers and 
sellers.
Price Disparity. A 2 order (first vs. second) x 2 role (buyers vs. sellers)
repeated measures ANOVA with mug price as the dependent variable reveals a main 
effect of role (F(1, 129) = 24.95, p < .0001) and an interaction between role and order
(F(1, 129) = 12.95, p < .005). We expected to find a price disparity when comparing 
buying and selling prices in the first stage of the study. At this stage, only either the 
focus of buyers or sellers was salient to the participants. As expected, planned 
contrasts indicate that buying prices ($ 2.38) are lower than selling prices ($ 3.88), 
revealing the price disparity effect (F(1, 129) = 12.59, p < .001). When comparing 
buying and selling prices in the second stage of the study, when both foci of buyers 
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and sellers were salient to each participant, we expected the effect to be reduced, but 
not eliminated, as compared to the effect found in the first stage of the study. 
Consistent with our prediction and supporting the motivated valuation explanation, a 
main effect of role (F(1, 129) = 4.16, p < .05) suggests that buying prices ($ 2.01) are 
still significantly lower than selling prices ($ 2.68), even when both buyers and sellers 
are aware of the aspects that both buyers and sellers cognitively focus during a 
transaction.
Thoughts about Money. A 2 order (first vs. second) x 2 role (buyers vs. 
sellers) repeated measures ANOVA with number of thoughts about money as the 
dependent variable reveals only the main effect of role (F(1, 129) = 16.03, p < .001). 
No other effects were significant in this analysis (all p > .47). Follow-up contrasts
reveal that sellers had more thoughts about money than buyers, both in the first stage 
(F(1, 129) = 16.03, p < .01) and in the second stage of the study (F(1, 129) = 5.19, p
< .05).
Because the effect of order was non-significant on specific thoughts (p > .25), 
the specific thoughts about money were pooled across the two order conditions. As 
expected, a 2 role (buyers vs. sellers) x 3 type of thought about money (give up vs. 
get vs. general) repeated measures ANOVA reveals a significant main effect of role 
(F(1, 261) = 12.26, p < .01), qualified by an interaction between role and type of 
thought (F(1, 261) = 8.55, p < .01). Consistent with the motivated valuation account, 
planned contrasts suggest that buyers had more thoughts about giving up money than 
sellers (F(1, 261) = 9.93, p < .01) and sellers had more thoughts about getting money 
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than buyers (F(1, 261) = 86.75, p < .01). Buyers and sellers did not differ in terms of 
thoughts about money in general (F(1, 261) = .98, p > .32, see figure 6).
Thoughts about the Product. A 2 order (first vs. second) x 2 role (buyers vs. 
sellers) repeated measures ANOVA with number of thoughts about the product as 
dependent variable reveals only a main effect of role (F(1, 129) = 17.04, p < .001). 
No other effects were significant in this analysis (all p > .12). Follow-up contrasts
suggest that buyers had more thoughts about the product than sellers, both in the first 
stage (F(1, 130) = 5.09, p < .05) and in the second stage of the study (F(1, 129) = 
6.04, p < .05).
Because the effect of order was non-significant (p > .93), the specific thoughts 
about the product were analyzed by role only (data was pooled across the two order
conditions). A 2 role (buyers vs. sellers) x 3 type of thought about product (positive 
vs. negative vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA reveals a significant main effect 
of role (F(1, 261) = 11.52, p < .01), qualified by an interaction between role and type 
of thought (F(1, 261) = 8.45, p < .01). Contrasts suggest that buyers had more 
negative (F(1, 261) = 3.81, p < .05) and more neutral thoughts about the product than 
sellers (F(1, 261) = 11.40, p < .01), and buyers and sellers did not significantly differ 
in the number of positive thoughts about the product (p > .69). 
Other Thoughts. A 2 order (first vs. second) x 2 role (buyers vs. sellers) 
repeated measures ANOVA with number of other thoughts as dependent variable 
reveals no significant effects (p > .56), except for a marginal main effect of order 
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(F(1, 129) = 2.95, p < .10) suggesting that participants had marginally more “other 
thoughts” in the second stage of the study (Mfirst = .81, Msecond = 1.06).
Table 2.1 – Price and Thoughts as a Function of Role
First Stage Second Stage
Buyer Seller Buyer Seller
Price $2.38 (1.95) $3.88 (2.85) $2.01 (1.97) $2.68 (1.82)
Thoughts about Money .96 (.98) 1.51 (1.33)      .94 (1.16) 1.36 (.98)
     Give up money .51 (.76) .33 (.51) .53 (.76) .22 (.45)
     Get money .06 (.24) .52 (.62) .02 (.13) .80 (.83)
     Other money thoughts .39 (.60) .65 (.97) .37 (.66) .30 (.58)
Thoughts about Product 1.51 (1.17) .98 (1.49) 1.32 (1.50) .78 (.98)
     Positive .25 (.53) .19 (.50) .18 (.59) .29 (.73)
     Negative .54 (.78) .30 (.80) .47 (.88) .33 (.64)
     Neutral .72 (.84) .49 (1.09) .68 (1.13) .16 (.53)
Other Thoughts .86 (1.02) 1.06 (1.18) 1.08 (1.18) .77 (.86)
Total Number Thoughts 3.33 3.55 3.34 2.91
N 69 63 63 69
Note: Standard deviations appear between parentheses
Figure 6 - Thoughts about Giving Up Money, Getting Money, or General 
Thoughts about Money as a Function of Role
65
Discussion
We predicted that if the price disparity effect is being driven by buyers’ and 
sellers’ intrinsic motivation rather than their cognitive foci based on loss aversion, 
making the foci of both buyers and sellers salient to all participants should reduce, but 
not eliminate the effect. Previous research suggests that the effect emerges because
both buyers and sellers focus on what they are foregoing or giving up. If individuals’ 
foci on specific aspects of the transaction would fully explain the price disparity, 
elaborating on these aspects should eliminate the effect. If, on the other hand, their 
intrinsic motivation is playing a role in leading to the effect, making the foci of 
buyers and sellers salient to all participants should reduce the price disparity, but not 
eliminate it. Supporting our proposition that the different goals of buyers and sellers 
affect product valuation and lead to a disparity in buying and selling prices, we found
that the disparity in prices was reduced, but not eliminated, when we forced attention 
to the aspects that both buyers and sellers focus in a transaction. At the very least, 
these results suggest that cognitive foci due to loss aversion cannot fully explain the 
effect.
Analysis of the spontaneous thoughts generated by buyers and sellers both in 
the first and second stages of the study also provides support for the motivated 
valuation account. Consistent with the motivated valuation proposition, buyers had 
more thoughts about what they were giving up (i.e., money) and sellers had more 
thoughts about what they were getting (i.e., money) in both the stages of the study. 
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Analysis of the thoughts also suggests that loss aversion cannot fully explain the price 
disparity effect. Loss aversion would predict that sellers would generate more 
thoughts about the product that they are giving up and buyers would generate more 
thoughts about the money that they are giving up (Carmon and Ariely 2000). As such, 
loss aversion only account for the buyers but not the sellers. Moreover, cognitive foci 
due to loss aversion suggests that sellers would generate more positive thoughts about 
the product and buyers would generate more negative thoughts about the product 
(Nayakankuppam and Mishra 2005), but we only found differences consistent with 
this rationale in the negative and neutral thoughts about the product. 
Although the weak support for previous cognitive perspective theories based 
on loss aversion could have been caused by factors such as the specific questions we 
asked, the results do suggest that adopting the role of buyers and sellers triggers more 
than simply different cognitive foci. Analysis of the thoughts about money suggests 
that, consistent with the motivated valuation explanation, buyers approach the buying 
task primarily concerned about what they are giving up whereas sellers approach the 
selling task primarily concerned about what they are getting, even when they played 
the opposite role immediately before. While this analysis is consistent with our 
theorizing, we investigate this proposition more directly in the next studies.
In study 2 we provide additional evidence for our proposition by measuring 
reaction time to goal-related words to investigate the extent to which buyers have the 
goal of minimizing what they are giving up and sellers have the goal of maximizing
what they are getting. One commonly employed method to assess goal activation is to 
measure response latencies to stimuli that is related to the goal of interest (Shah 
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2003). When specific goals are activated, experimental participants should be faster 
in responding to stimuli associated with that goal.
Study 2: Buyer and Seller Roles Activate Different Goals
The goal of study 2 is to examine the extent to which the role of buyers is 
associated with the goal of minimizing what they are giving up and the role of sellers 
is associated with the goal of maximizing what they are getting. To do so, we 
assigned participants the role of buyers or sellers and then measured their response 
latency to words related to minimization or maximization. The study used Medialab®
and Direct RT® in a desktop computer.
Method
The study employed a one-factor, between-subjects design with two 
conditions (buyers vs. sellers) and 49 marketing students participated in several 
studies grouped in a one-hour session in exchange for extra credit. When participants 
arrived at the lab, they found a new, black coffee mug in their computer stations. 
Following a procedure similar to the one employed in study 1, participants were 
either assigned the role of buyer or seller and were asked to indicate the highest price 
they would be willing to buy the mug or the lowest price they would be willing to sell 
the mug. Participants then completed a supposedly unrelated task. The second task in 
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this study was a lexical decision task in which participants had to identify as quickly 
and accurately as possible whether a stimulus presented in a desktop computer was a 
word or a non-word (using the “/” and the “z” keys). Participants were asked to fix 
their attention to three asterisks (“***”). This fixation point was followed by a 
meaningless mask (“xvxvxvxv”), which was then replaced by the target word. The 
target words appeared in the same location after a very brief delay that varied 
randomly in duration (from 250 to 750 ms) to avoid participants anticipating the 
target’s appearance. 
Targets were words related to buyers’ goal of minimizing what they are giving 
up (minimize, decrease, reduce), words related to sellers’ goal of maximizing what 
they are getting (maximize, enlarge, enhance), neutral words (ranch, shampoo, 
staple), and non-words (e.g., douse, roises, svonu, bught, gorbit, lupaso, troit, fangen, 
zelote). A combination of 3 minimize-related words, 3 maximize-related words, 3 
neutral words, and 9 non-words yielded 18 trials. After six practice trials with 
different neutral words, response time to participants’ decision of whether the target 
was a word or a non-word was measured. We expected that buyers would be faster in 
identifying words related to the goal of minimizing, and sellers would be faster in 
identifying words related to the goal of maximizing.
Results
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Price. An ANOVA with role as a factor and the mug prices as dependent 
variable indicates that buying prices ($ 1.97) are lower than selling prices ($ 3.17), 
revealing the expected price disparity effect (F(1, 47) = 5.67, p < .02). 
Reaction Time to Goal-Related Words. To analyze the latencies, we removed 
the trials faster than 300ms and slower than 2000ms (Bargh and Chartrand 2000) and 
performed analysis on response latencies for correct responses (Shah 2003). The 
removed trials (5.89%) were well distributed across conditions (χ2 (2) = 0.54, p > 
.76). Minimize-related words, maximize-related words, and neutral words were 
averaged in respective indices. Table 2.2 shows the reaction times to words related to 
minimize, maximize and neutral words for buyers and sellers. One-way ANOVAs 
with role as a factor (buyers vs. sellers) and reaction times to minimize, maximize or 
neutral words as dependent variables suggest that buyers responded faster to 
minimize-related words than sellers (Mbuyers = 627.03 ms, Msellers = 733.49 ms, F(1, 
47) = 4.36, p < .05) and sellers responded faster to maximize-related words than 
buyers (Mbuyers = 732.81 ms, Msellers = 613.55 ms, F(1, 47) = 4.85, p < .05). Buyers 
and sellers did not differ on how fast they responded to neutral words (Mbuyers = 
696.38 ms, Msellers = 680.15 ms, F(1, 47) = .11, p > .74).
A within role analysis conducted with a 2 role (buyers vs. sellers) x 3 target 
type (minimize vs. maximize vs. neutral) repeated measures ANOVA reveals a 
significant interaction (F(2, 92) = 8.41, p < .01). Planned contrasts suggest that 
buyers responded faster to minimize-related words than to maximize-related words 
(F(1, 92) = 8.71, p < .01), and faster to minimize-related words than to neutral words 
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(F(1, 92) = 3.74, p = .05), but with the same speed to maximize-related words and 
neutral words (F(1, 92) = 1.03, p > .31). Sellers responded faster to maximize-related 
words than to minimize-related words (F(1, 92) = 8.10, p < .01), marginally faster to 
maximize-related words than to neutral words (F(1, 92) = 2.64, p = .10), but with the 
same speed to minimize-related words and neutral words (F(1, 92) = 2.13, p > .15).
Table 2.2 - Reaction Time (in Milliseconds) to Words in the Lexical Decision 
Task as a Function of Role.
Buyers Sellers
Minimize Neutral Maximize Minimize Neutral Maximize
Reaction 
time
627.03 696.38 732.81 733.49 680.15 613.55
SD 89.99 162.39 190.05 237.96 181.25 184.49
N 25 25 25 24 24 23




Study 2 supports our prediction that buyers are faster in identifying words 
related to minimization, the proposed goal of buyers, and sellers are faster in 
identifying words related to maximization, the proposed goal of sellers. These results 
provide support for our proposition that buyers and sellers have different goals 
activated when valuing a product. Study 2 uses a task that was previously used to 
investigate the price disparity effect and suggests that the roles of buyer or seller are 
associated with the notion of minimizing and maximizing, respectively, which 
provides support for the motivated valuation explanation for the price disparity effect. 
Loss aversion and the notion of minimizing losses could account for the results found 
for buyers, but could not account for the results found for sellers.
In study 3 we apply another principle of goal theory to test whether the goal of 
buyers and sellers influence their product valuation. Specifically, we prime the goals 
of “give up” or “accept” to neutral traders and examine the extent to which these 
primes will reproduce the price disparity effect. The goal of buyers is associated with
minimizing what they are giving up in an exchange whereas the goal of sellers is 
associated with what they are getting or accepting in an exchange. Buyers wish to 
minimize what they are giving up, while sellers wish to maximize what they are 
getting. Based on goal theory, we predict that the mere exposure of participants to the 
words “give up” or “accept” will respectively activate the implicit goal of buying or 
selling, generating product valuations consistent with those goals and conceptually 
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reproducing the price disparity effect, even in transactions where money is not 
involved.
Study 3: Activating Give up and Get Leads to Price Disparity
In study 3 we primed the goals of buyers and sellers to neutral traders by 
framing the valuation question differently. Rather than assigning participants 
explicitly to the role of buyers or sellers, all participants received the task of trading a 
commodity in a “barter game.” The goals of buyers and sellers were primed by asking 
participants how much of the other commodity they would be willing to give up for 
one unity of their commodity (priming the goal of a buyer) or how much of the other 
commodity they would be willing to accept for one unity of their commodity 
(priming the goal of a seller). Trader was a replicate and goal prime was the factor of 
interest. If participants assigned to the “give up” condition are motivated to minimize 
what they are giving up and participants assigned to the “accept” condition are 
motivated to maximize what they are getting, a main effect of the primes conceptually 
replicates the disparity between buying and selling prices by activating the goals of 
buyers and sellers. We expected to find a disparity between the quantity of 
commodities “given up” and “accepted” in both trading conditions. 
Method
We conducted a 2 trader (corn vs. eggs) x 2 prime (give up vs. accept) full 
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factorial, between subjects design. Participants were 156 college students recruited to 
participate in the study in exchange for extra credit. First, participants learned that 
barter is a type of trade in which goods and services are directly exchanged for other 
goods/services, without the use of money. They learned that although barter is often 
regarded as an old-fashioned means of exchange, it still counts for a high percentage 
of trades in rural communities, and that it is growing in popularity today with 
consumers and businesses realizing that this is a great way to budget and a creative 
way to lower expenses. 
Manipulations. Participants learned that two individuals would play a barter 
game, and that while one individual would be randomly assigned the role of a corn 
farmer and would trade corn, the other would be assigned the role of an animal farmer 
and would trade eggs. Participants were randomly assigned the role of a trader of corn 
or a trader of eggs and were told that they would have the opportunity to barter or 
trade their corn and eggs. In the give up condition, participants were asked to indicate 
the number of corn (eggs) they would be willing to give up for each egg (corn). In the 
accept condition, participants were asked to indicate the number of eggs (corn) they 
would be willing to accept for each corn (egg). Lastly, participants completed goal 
measures.
Measures. The dependent variable was the quantity (in units) of commodity 
that the traders would be willing to give up or accept for one unity of the other 
commodity. 
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As manipulation checks, we asked participants to indicate what they were 
giving up (eggs or corn) and what they were accepting (eggs or corn). Goals were 
measured in two different ways. First, participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which their objective was to (1) maximize what they were getting or (7) minimize 
what they were giving up, and the extent to which it was more important for them to 
(1) maximize what they were getting or (7) minimize what they were giving up. 
Second, participants were asked to check the activities that they thought about during 
the barter game. The options were a) maximize what you are getting and b) minimize 
what you are giving up. 
Results
Three participants indicated a number of their commodity that they would be 
willing to trade that was higher than 10 standard deviations above the average and 
were removed from the final analysis. The results were unchanged in terms of 
significance or direction. Table 2.3 shows the means of the dependent measure by 
condition.
Manipulation Checks. Given that 94.8% of the traders of corn and 93.4% of 
the traders of eggs correctly identified that they were giving up corn and eggs, 
respectively (χ2 = 119.1, p < .001) and that 90.9% of the traders of corn and 89.5% of 
the traders of eggs correctly identified that they were getting eggs or corn, 
respectively (χ2 = 98.9, p < .001), we can conclude that participants understood the 
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manipulations. 
Because the results were consistent for the goal manipulation check measures, 
the two items were averaged into a goal index (r = .64, p < .01). A 2 trader (corn vs. 
eggs) x 2 prime (give up vs. accept) ANOVA with participants’ goal as the dependent 
variable reveals the expected main effect of prime (F (1, 149) = 14.77, p < .001).  
This main effect suggests that participants assigned to the give up condition had the 
goal of minimizing what they were giving up to a greater extent than participants 
assigned to the accept condition, regardless of whether they were playing the role of a 
trader of corn (Mgive up = 3.30, Maccept = 2.54) or a trader of eggs (Mgive up = 3.57, 
Maccept = 2.22). No other effects were significant in this analysis (all p > .28). 
Significantly more participants assigned to the accept condition (53.38%) 
thought about maximizing what they were getting during the barter game than 
participants assigned to the give up condition (46.6%, χ2 = 5.21, p < .05). Conversely, 
significantly more participants assigned to the give up condition (61.26%) thought 
about minimizing what they were giving up than participants assigned to the accept 
condition (38.73%, χ2 = 15.00, p < .01).
Quantity of Commodity Trading. A 2 trader (corn vs. eggs) x 2 prime (give up 
vs. accept) ANOVA with the number of commodity that traders would be willing to 
trade as the dependent variable reveals only the expected main effect of prime (F (1, 
149) = 17.56, p < .001).  Contrasts suggest that the disparity between the number of 
commodity that participants are willing to give up or accept is significant both when 
we compare the quantity within traders of corn (Mgive up corn = 1.86, Maccept corn = 2.53, 
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F (1, 149) = 4.13, p < .05) or within traders of eggs (Mgive up egg = 1.78, Maccept egg = 
3.07, F (1, 149) = 15.10, p < .01), and across traders (Fgive up corn vs. accept egg (1, 149) = 
5.03, p < .05; Fgive up egg vs. accept corn (1, 149) = 3.51, p < .06). No other effects were 
significant in this analysis (all p > .19). 
Table 2.3 - Means (and Standard Deviations) of Dependent Measures as a 
Function of Trader and Prime.
Trader of Corn Trader of Eggs
Give up Accept Give up Accept
Mean quantity 1.86 (1.14) 2.53 (1.41) 1.78 (.96) 3.07 (.205)
Goals 3.30 (1.69) 2.54 (1.36) 3.57 (2.03) 2.22 (1.59)
N 40 37 39 37
Discussion
Consistent with the motivated valuation account, exposing participants to the 
words “give up” and “accept” activated the goals of buyers and sellers respectively, 
and produced a disparity in the quantity of commodities given up and accepted that 
conceptually replicates the disparity between buying and selling prices. Results 
suggest that, when trading, consumers have the goal of minimizing what they are 
giving up and maximizing what they are getting, and when these goals differ (e.g., 
when there is a buyer and a seller), we observe a discrepancy in the valuation of the 
product. 
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In study 4 we investigate the moderating role of pursuing multiple goals on 
pursuit of the focal goal of buying or selling. Research on goal theory suggests that 
goals can be represented as a cognitive structure and, as such, the activation of a goal 
should be able to facilitate or hinder the pursuit of related goals (Shah, Friedman, and 
Kruglanski 2002). Consequently, behavior should depend on the relative activation 
and inhibition of goals. Shah et al. (2002) propose that the effect of alternative goals 
on focal goal pursuit depends on the relationship between the alternative goals and 
the focal goal. Activating consistent alternative goals draws resources toward the 
focal goal (i.e., facilitates pursuit of the focal goal), and activating conflicting
alternative goals pulls resources away from the focal goal (i.e., hinders pursuit of the 
focal goal). 
Building upon this theory, we assume that activation of consistent or 
conflicting alternative goals will change behavior of individuals pursuing the focal 
goals of buying or selling. In a commercial transaction, it is reasonable to assume that 
negotiators would behave consistently with their own interests, such that buyers 
would be motivated to pay a low price and sellers would be motivated to charge a 
high price (Bazerman 1983, Thompson, Valley, and Kramer 1995). Therefore, 
activating the alternative goal of competition, which should instigate a desire to have 
an advantage over the other part in the transaction, should facilitate buyers’ and 
sellers’ goal pursuit and enhance the price disparity effect. Conversely, activating the 
alternative goal of cooperation should instigate a desire to considerate the needs of 
the other party in the transaction and make negotiators more willing to sacrifice their 
own outcomes in favor of social welfare. Therefore, the alternative goal of 
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cooperation should hinder pursuit of the focal goal of buying or selling and weaken 
the price disparity effect. In sum, priming competition should draw resources toward 
the focal goal of buying or selling and enhance the price disparity effect. Conversely, 
priming cooperation should pull resources away from the focal goal of buying or 
selling and weaken the effect.
Study 4: Pursuing Alternative Goal Moderates the Price Disparity Effect
The purpose of study 4 is to investigate the moderating role of pursuit of 
alternative goals on pursuit of the buying or selling focal goals. We primed a 
competition goal or a cooperation goal in buyers and sellers in such a way that the 
pursuit of the focal goals of buyers and sellers would either be strengthened or 
weakened.  
Method
Ninety-one marketing students participated in a paper-based study in 
exchange for extra credit. The study employed a 3 goal (cooperation vs. control vs. 
competition) x 2 role (buyer vs. seller) full factorial, between-subjects design. The 
goal manipulation adopted in this study has been shown effective in activating goals 
(Bargh et al. 2001). Participants were led to believe they would complete two 
independent studies. The first contained two tasks, a word-search puzzle and a 
scrambled word test that consisted of the cooperation and competition goal 
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manipulation, and the second contained the role manipulation and the dependent 
measure. The role manipulation and dependent measure were adapted from Carmon 
and Ariely (2000). To interview basketball fans who were asked to imagine that they 
owned (sellers) or did not own (buyers) a ticket for an important college basketball 
game, students were pre-screened to indicate the degree to which they like basketball 
in a scale ranging from 1 (I don’t like basketball at all) to 9 (I like basketball very 
much). Only those who reported to like basketball (indicated 5 or more in the scale) 
participated in the paper-based study.   
Alternative Goal Manipulation. In each of the three conditions, participants 
were presented with a 10 x 10 matrix of letters, below of which there was a list of 13 
words that were embedded in the matrix. Words appeared with letters in a straight 
line either from left to right or from right to left, reading down or reading up, and 
diagonally reading either down or up. Each list contained the same set of five neutral 
words to be found (bear, green, staple, lamp, plant), with the remaining eight words 
relevant to the condition. In the cooperation goal condition, these words were fair, 
helpful, cooperate, reasonable, supportive, assist, friendly, and share. In the 
competition goal condition, these words were win, compete, succeed, strive, battle, 
attain, achieve, and master. In the control condition, these words were ranch, carpet, 
river, building, shampoo, robin, hat, and window. In the second task participants 
looked at several scrambled sentences containing 5 words each and were asked to use 
4 of them to form a coherent sentence. An example of a cooperation sentence is “she 
helps other people,” an example of a competition sentence is “he was the champion,” 
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and an example of a control sentence is “the flowers have bloomed.” Participants had 
about 10 minutes to complete these two tasks. 
Role Manipulation. The second part of the study contained the role 
manipulation and a task that has been used before to investigate discrepancy in 
buying and selling prices (Carmon and Ariely 2000). Participants were informed that 
we were interested in the process of product valuation and price setting and that their 
task was to determine an appropriate price for some items. Participants were asked to 
imagine that they did or did not have a ticket for an important upcoming college 
basketball game. All of the participants learned that they would not have the 
opportunity to negotiate or bargain, and they were encouraged to indicate their true 
assessments. 
Dependent Variable. The price given by buyers and sellers was our dependent 
variable. Buyers were asked for the highest price they would pay for the ticket, 
assuming they did not have one. Sellers were asked for the lowest price they would 
sell the ticket, assuming they had one. 
Results
Manipulation Check. The goal manipulation was pretested with 49 students 
drawn from the same population of the study and was shown to be effective (F (1, 47) 
= 5.29, p < .05). Participants completed the puzzle and the scrambled-word task and 
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then completed a filler task consisting of a neutral text about Maryland Day. After 
answering irrelevant questions about the text (e.g., “was the information in the text 
informative?”), participants indicated the extent to which they think most college 
students “are collaborative people/competitive people,” “care about other people/care 
only about themselves,” and “think about their partner when negotiating/think only 
about themselves when negotiating.” Using these three measures (α = .69) with scale 
points ranging from -4 to 4, participants assigned to the cooperation condition were 
found to be in a more cooperative mindset than participants assigned to the 
competition condition (Mcooperation = .17, Mcompetition = 1.16).
Price. Table 2.4 shows the means of the dependent variable by condition. A 2 
role (buyer vs. seller) x 3 goal (cooperation vs. control vs. competition) ANOVA with 
price as dependent variable revealed a main effect of role (F (1, 85) = 27.41, p < 
.001), qualified by the predicted interaction between goal and role (F (2, 85) = 5.10, p
< .01). These results suggest a significant downward linear trend for buying prices as 
participants’ goals shift from cooperation to competition (F (1, 45) = 4.84, p < .05), 
and a significant upward linear trend for selling prices as participants’ goals shift 
from cooperation to competition (F (1, 40) = 5.84, p < .05). Planned contrasts suggest 
that, as predicted, the price disparity effect was non-significant in the cooperation 
condition (Mbuyers = 79.23, Msellers = 100.00, F (1, 85) = .58, p > .44), significant in the 
control condition (Mbuyers = 47.06, Msellers = 129.23, F (1, 85) = 9.11, p < .01), and 
significant and stronger in the competition condition (Mbuyers = 42.78, Msellers = 
185.77, F (1, 85) = 28.25, p < .001). The results are illustrated in Figure 8.
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Table 2.4 - Means (and Standard Deviations) of Price as a Function of Role 
and Goal.
Buyers Sellers
Cooperation Control Competition Cooperation Control Competition
Price 79.23 (73.08) 47.06 (24.24) 42.78 (34.13) 100.00 (69.60) 129.23 (92.08) 185.77 (126.42)
N 13 17 18 17 13 13
Figure 8 - Buying and Selling Prices Under Competition and Cooperation
Discussion
As predicted, pursuing alternative goals facilitates or hinders pursuit of the 
focal goal of buying or selling, providing support for the motivated valuation account 
that product valuation is a consequence of buyers and sellers pursuing the goals 
associated with their social roles. When participants were primed with cooperation, 
which is an alternative goal that conflicts with the focal goal of buying or selling and 
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therefore pulls resources away from the focal goal, the price disparity effect was 
eliminated. Conversely, when participants were primed with competition, which is an 
alternative goal that is consistent with the focal goal of buying or selling and therefore 
pulls resources towards the focal goal, the price disparity effect was enhanced. The 
significant effect of pursuing alternative goals on the pursuit of the focal goal of 
buying or selling provides support for the motivated valuation hypothesis by showing 
that the behavior of buyers and sellers changes systematically following principles of 
goal theory. If the buying or selling tasks were independent from motivation and were 
simply a function of attention to different aspects of the transaction, activating 
alternative goals should not affect the product valuation of buyers and sellers. 
Similarly to the pursuit of multiple goals, another factor that may facilitate or 
hinder pursuit of the focal goal is goal fluency (or fit). Therefore, goal fluency should 
also moderate the price disparity effect and provide additional evidence that buyers 
and sellers are pursuing different goals. When the context is congruent with 
participants’ goals, high goal fluency is experienced and participants decide on an 
acceptable price more quickly, more easily, and with greater confidence.  On the 
other hand, when the context is incongruent with participants’ goals, low goal fluency 
is experienced and participants decide on an acceptable price more slowly, with 
greater difficulty and with less confidence. We also predict that fluency will affect the 
outcome of goal pursuit. The high fluency experienced will facilitate goal pursuit and 
buyers will be able to come up with a lower price and sellers will be able to come up 
with a higher price, leading to the price disparity effect. On the other hand, low 
fluency will hurt goal pursuit, so buyers will not be able to come up with such low 
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price and sellers will not be able to come up with such high price, leading to 
elimination of the price disparity effect. Therefore, when the valuation question fits 
with the goal participants are pursuing, they will experience fluency, and this ease of 
processing will facilitate goal congruent behavior, allowing participants to sell for a 
high price or buy for a low price. Conversely, when the valuation question does not 
fit with participants’ goal, the difficulty of processing that they will experience will 
hurt goal congruent behavior, eliminating the price disparity effect. 
Study 5: Goal Fluency Moderates the Price Disparity Effect 
The goal of study 5 is to examine the moderating role of goal fluency on the 
price disparity effect. We expect an interaction between role and fluency such that 
when fluency is high (i.e., when the valuation question matches the goal of buyers 
and sellers), the goal pursuit of buyers and sellers will be facilitated and buyers and 
sellers will come up with lower and higher prices, respectively, leading to the price 
disparity effect. However, when fluency is low (i.e., when the valuation question 
conflicts with the goal of buyers and sellers), the goal pursuit of buyers and sellers 
will be hindered and the price disparity effect will not be observed. 
Method
We conducted a 2 role (buyer vs. seller) x 2 fluency (high fluency vs. low 
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fluency) full factorial, between-subjects design. Participants were 138 college 
students who were recruited to participate in the study in exchange for extra credit. 
When they arrived at the lab, participants found a new, black pen on their computer 
stations. 
Manipulations. Role was manipulated by assigning participants to either the 
role of a buyer or a seller of the pen. Fluency was manipulated by the way we framed 
the valuation question. In the high fluency condition, we asked buyers to specify the 
maximum price that they would pay to buy the pen (and take it home), and sellers to 
specify the minimum price that they would accept to sell the pen (and give it away). 
In the low fluency condition we asked buyers to specify the minimum price that they 
would reject to buy the pen (and return it), and sellers to specify the maximum price 
that they would reject to sell the pen (and take it home). The first valuation question 
is the natural way to which buyers and sellers approach a transaction and, therefore, 
participants should experience high fluency. The second valuation question, although 
what it is asking is exactly the same, is an unnatural way to approach a transaction 
and, consequently, participants should experience low fluency.
Measures. The dependent variables were the price at which participants 
valued the pen and participants’ response times to the price question (in 
milliseconds). 
We measured perceived fluency with three items capturing the perceived 
speed of response to the price question (“not at all fast-very fast,” “it was slow-it was 
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quick,” and “it took much time-it took little time”), three items capturing ease of 
processing of the information presented in the task (“easy to process-difficult to 
process,” “easy to understand-difficult to understand,” and “effortless to process-
effortful to process”), and one item capturing participant’s confidence in their 
response (“not at all confident-very confident), all adapted from Labroo and Lee 
(2006) and Lee and Aaker (2004). Finally, we measured participants’ goals with 3 
items (“my objective was to maximize acceptable price to me-minimize acceptable 
price to me,” “it was more important to me to maximize acceptable price to me-
minimize acceptable price to me,” and “my goal was to maximize what I was getting-
minimize what I was getting). All fluency and goal items ranged from one to seven.
Results
Table 2.5 shows the means of the variables by condition.
Manipulation Checks. A 2 (role) x 2 (fluency) ANOVA with perceived speed 
(α = .91) as the dependent variable shows the predicted main effect of fluency (F (1, 
134) = 8.35, p < .01). Participants perceived their response to the price question as 
faster in the high fluency condition (Mhigh fluency = 5.54, Mlow fluency = 4.91). A 2 (role) x 
2 (fluency) ANOVA with perceived ease (α = .90) as the dependent variable shows 
the predicted main effect of fluency (F (1, 134) = 7.57, p < .01). Participants 
perceived the information presented in the task as easier to process in the high fluency 
condition (Mhigh fluency = 1.58, Mlow fluency = 2.07). A 2 (role) x 2 (fluency) ANOVA 
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with confidence as the dependent variable also shows the predicted main effect of 
fluency (F (1, 134) = 4.49, p < .05). Participants were more confident that they came 
up with a price that was acceptable for them in the high fluency condition (Mhigh fluency
= 5.99, Mlow fluency = 5.55). 
A 2 (role) x 2 (fluency) ANOVA with goal (α = .83) as the dependent variable 
shows the predicted main effect of role (F (1, 134) = 58.55, p < .01). Buyers tended to 
minimize the price/what they were giving up (Mbuyers = 4.98) and sellers tended to 
maximize the price/what they were getting (Msellers = 2.82). 
Price. A 2 (role) x 2 (fluency) ANOVA with price as the dependent variable 
shows a main effect of fluency (F (1, 134) = 8.59, p < .01) that was qualified by the 
predicted interaction between role and fluency (F (1, 134) = 4.38, p < .05). Planned 
contrasts suggest that the price disparity effect was significant in the high fluency 
condition (F (1, 134) = 6.91, p < .01), but buying and selling prices did not differ in 
the low fluency condition (F (1, 134) = .17, p > .67). 
A 2 (role) x 2 (fluency) ANOVA with the response time to the price question 
as the dependent variable shows a main effect of role (F (1, 134) = 5.48, p < .05) and, 
more importantly, a main effect of fluency (F (1, 134) = 19.80, p < .001). Participants 
decided on an acceptable price for them more quickly in the high fluency condition 
(Mhigh fluency = 24,806, Mlow fluency = 33,839).
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Table 2.5 - Means (and Standard Deviations) of Dependent Measures as a 
Function of Role and Fluency.
Buyers Sellers
High fluency Low fluency High fluency Low fluency
Price .76 (.54) 1.45 (1.04) 1.25 (.72) 1.36 (.84)
Goal 4.97 (1.81) 4.99 (1.56) 2.84 (1.66) 2.81 (1.51)
Response time 23,950 (10,229) 29,988 (9,715) 25,662 (10,689) 37,889 (15,710)
Perceived speed 5.82 (1.37) 4.98 (1.37) 5.31 (1.36) 4.85 (1.49)
Perceived ease 1.41 (.62) 1.93 (1.20) 1.72 (.93) 2.17 (1.27)
Confidence 6.15 (.97) 5.57 (1.48) 5.85 (.99) 5.53 (1.50)
N 33 28 41 36
Discussion
Study 5 provides additional support for the motivated valuation hypothesis by 
showing that goal fluency moderates the price disparity effect. Goal fluency leads 
participants not only to come up with an acceptable price for them more quickly, but 
also to perceive their responses as quicker, easier, and held with greater confidence. 
More importantly, when the context does not fit with the goal that buyers and sellers 
are pursuing, goal pursuit is hindered and while the price disparity is significant when 
fluency is high, it becomes non-significant when fluency is low. Study 5 provides 
additional evidence for the motivated valuation hypothesis and for the idea that the 
price disparity effect is a function of the goals of buyers and sellers by showing that a 
factor that affects goal pursuit moderates the price disparity effect. 
The fluency manipulation was designed to help or hinder goal pursuit and, 
therefore, provide support for the idea that buyers and sellers’ product valuation is a 
consequence of buyers and sellers pursuing their intrinsic goals of minimizing what 
they are giving up and maximizing what they are getting, respectively. There are no 
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theoretical reasons to believe that the fluency manipulation would affect the degree of 
buyers’ and sellers’ loss aversion, making loss aversion an unlikely explanation for 
these results. A second alternative explanation for our results is the possibility that 
participants did not understand the task they had to complete in the low fluency 
condition. However, the mean of the measure of ease of processing, which includes
difficulty, is significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale (F (1, 137) = 593.89, p
< .001). Thus, we believe that participants understood the task that they had to 
complete.
General Discussion
In a series of five studies we provide support for a motivated valuation 
explanation for the price disparity effect.  We show that adopting the social role of 
buyers or sellers activates different goals that lead to different product valuation. 
Specifically, buyers are primarily concerned with what they are giving up in a 
transaction and are thus motivated to minimize it (e.g., money in most transactions) 
and sellers are primarily concerned with what they are getting in a transaction and are 
thus motivated to maximize it (e.g., money is most transactions). Drawing from goal 
theory, we show that altering the dynamics of goal pursuit produces systematic and 
predictable changes in product valuation, reproducing or eliminating the price 
disparity effect. By supporting the motivated valuation explanation and showing that 
buyers’ and sellers’ goals influence their product valuation, the present work 
contributes to research on the price disparity effect, and more specifically to our 
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understanding of the factors leading to this disparity. Our results also contribute to 
practice by showing that certain frames of mind that negotiators bring to a transaction 
may affect the price that is acceptable for them.
Explanations based on loss aversion are highly popular (Ariely et al. 2005; 
Brenner et al. 2007; Carmon and Ariely 2000; Nayakankuppan and Mishra 2005; 
Zhang and Fishbach 2005). We do not attempt to rule out loss aversion as playing a 
role in the price disparity effect, but we argue that beyond loss aversion, buyers’ and 
sellers’ intrinsic goals to “make the best deal” motivate them to value an item in 
opposite directions, leading to a product valuation disparity. By providing support for 
this explanation we offer a more parsimonious view of the price disparity effect, and 
also explore ways to alter the process of goal pursuit and, consequently, the observed 
outcome in the form of different product valuation.
Our motivated valuation explanation can account for emphatic gaps that have 
been found between buyers and sellers. Van Boven and colleagues (2000) have 
shown that people mispredict what their own valuation would be if they were in the 
other role. They explain that people usually have difficulty in setting aside their own 
perspective when estimating the perspective of someone else, and as a result, buyers 
and sellers usually overestimate the similarity between their valuation and the 
valuation of the other party. When individuals assume the social roles or buyers or 
sellers and pursuit the goals intrinsically associated with these roles, they may not be 
completely aware of the intrinsic goals that they are pursuing or of the effect of these 
goals on their behavior, and this would lead to a mistaken estimation of how the other 
party would value the same item.
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It would be interesting to examine the process by which factors such as 
pursuit of multiple goals or goal fluency affects goal pursuit and, therefore, goal 
achievement. It is expected that moderating factors would change what lays between 
the goal and the outcome, that is, the means of achieving a goal. It would also be 
interesting to examine the means that buyers and sellers use to achieve their goals and 
how changing those means affects product valuation. It would also be interesting to 
investigate in future research how other variables may moderate the effect. We argue 
that the price disparity effect emerges due to a social motivation of buyers and sellers 
to minimize what they are giving up and maximize what they are getting, 
respectively. A “social” motivation is inherent to the social environment consumers 
live and may vary from place to place. Therefore, cultural factors are likely to 
moderate the effect, changing these intrinsic motivations or the intensity with which 
they are pursued. 
Finally, buying and selling prices are based on two fundamental factors: the 
“intrinsic” valuation of the item and the influence of perceived market conditions 
(Simonson and Drolet 2004). We focus on the first and examine conditions under 
which intrinsic valuation may change. It would be interesting to examine the interplay 
of traders’ goals and perceived market conditions such as the incidence of arbitrary or 
non arbitrary reference prices on product valuation (Lin, Chuang, and Kung 2006; 
Nunes and Boatwright 2004; Simonson and Drolet 2004). Would reliance on 
reference prices be stronger depending on the goal(s) negotiators are pursuing, on 
their goal commitment, or on perceived ease of achieving those goals?
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Appendices
Appendix 1 – Stimuli Used in Essay 1, Study 1
Among the various brands of laundry detergents currently on the market, those 
containing phosphates are by far the best. Phosphate detergents are vastly superior in 
cleaning power to other high quality, standard detergents. They clean clothes more 
thoroughly and leave them smelling much better compared to standard forms of 
detergent. As a result, they allow clothes to be cleaned less frequently, which extends 
the life of clothing. Perhaps because phosphate detergents are cheaper to produce and 
more effective, they have consistently topped the charts in customer satisfaction over 
the past few years.
More importantly, phosphate detergents are significantly less harmful to the 
environment than non-phosphate detergents. Indeed, for ordinary household use, it is 
now widely accepted that phosphate detergents are the cleanest and safest type of 
detergent on the market. In fact, standard detergents typically contain EDTA, a 
chemical additive associated with harmful environmental consequences even in small 
amounts. Thus, it is wisest to use phosphate detergents for household laundry
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Appendix 2 – Stimuli Used in Essay 1, Study 2
Among the various brands of laundry detergents currently on the market, those 
containing phosphates are far from the best. Phosphate detergents are vastly inferior 
in cleaning power to other high quality, standard detergents. They clean clothes less 
thoroughly and leave them smelling less fresh compared to standard forms of 
detergent. As a result, they require clothes to be cleaned more frequently, which 
decreases the life of clothing. 
More importantly, phosphate detergents are significantly more harmful to the 
environment than non-phosphate detergents. Indeed, for ordinary household use, it is 
now widely accepted that phosphate detergents are not the cleanest or the safest type 
of detergent on the market. In fact, phosphate detergents typically contain EDTA, a 
chemical additive associated with harmful environmental consequences even in small 
amounts. Thus, it is wisest not to use phosphate detergents for household laundry.
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Appendix 3 – Stimuli Used in Essay 1, Study 3
Imagine that you are looking for an apartment to rent. You have looked at a few 
apartments, but haven't found what you really want. Although you have seen several 
different apartments, nothing has seemed just right. You head into an apartment rental 
agency.
Picture yourself walking into the agency and looking at pictures and ads of 
apartments. There are pictures of different styles of apartments in various sizes and 
locations. A realtor walks up to you and says, "Hi, my name is Chris. Let me know if 
I can answer any questions for you."
Imagine that after looking through the pictures of several apartments, you 
narrow it down to two choices. The first is a nice, fairly standard apartment. The 
second apartment looks a little nicer, but it costs quite a bit more than the first. You 
look over the pictures one more time, looking carefully at the floor plans of each 
apartment. As you look at the picture of the second apartment, the realtor walks up to 
you and says, "That's a great apartment. I think it's a better option than the other one. 
Besides, it is very attractive."  You look at the pictures and the floor plans one more 
time, wondering whether you should get the second apartment.
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